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INTRODUCTION
Something is seriously amiss in national forest management.
After a staggering investment in planning over the course of the
past fifteen years, the U.S. Forest Service now claims it spends up
to $150 million a year dealing with administrative appeals.' This
figure compares to a FY93 budget of $118 million for wildlife and
fish habitat and $226 million for timber sales administration.2
Despite this investment in appeals, appellants are not satisfied with
1. Forest Service Appeals Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands, National
Parks and Forests of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources: Effect the
Appeal of Forest Plans and Timber Supply Sales May Have on Timber Supply and the
Forest Service's Ability to Meet its Mandate of Multiple Use and Sustained Yield, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. 25 (1991) (testimony of Dale Robertson, Chief, U.S. Forest Service)
[hereinafter Hearings 11.
2. See Forest Service Budget, RESOURCE HOTLINE (American Forests, Washington,
D.C.), Nov. 17, 1992, at 2.
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the system. Environmentalists complain that the Forest Service plays
a "shell game" with tiered decisions that make it difficult to
determine whether the agency has complied with environmental
laws.3 Commodities users, especially the timber industry, complain
that appeals create costly delay and uncertainty. The Forest Service
itself wants to alter its administrative process. 4
But the problem with the Forest Service appeals process is
more deeply rooted than its cost and results. The fundamental
problem with the current appeals system is that it reflects outdated
notions of public land management. This system is designed for an
oversimplified model of resource management that is informal,
discretionary, and purely technical. As a result, the appeals process
fails to reach its potential as an innovative tool for leveraging
overall improvement in national forest management. Although land
managers do need to apply their expertise to inventory resources
and forecast the consequences of management options, their mul-
tiple use mandate cannot be fulfilled without accounting for public
demands. The current appeals system is ill-equipped to address the
important hybrid questions that contain both technical and social
components, such as what quantities of goods (i.e. roadless areas,
timber, oil) to produce or maintain, which lands are suitable for
which uses, and what conditions should be placed on activities. In
addition, the current appeals system fails to achieve legitimate
administrative goals and makes poor use of the courts. The failure
of the system belies the image of the expert steward that the Forest
Service has cultivated over the past eighty-eight years.
This article describes the history of, and current developments
in, Forest Service appeals. It articulates feasible and appropriate
goals for a system of administrative appeals, and suggests two
major reforms: one procedural and one substanti'e. The procedural
reform would create an interdisciplinary, independent board of
forest appeals to hear administrative challenges of Forest Service
decisions. The substantive reform would allow the board to decide
appeals based not only on technical compliance with specific stat-
utory provisions and regulations but also on application of the
sustainability principle evident in modern resource management
legislation.
Implementation of these reforms will better achieve appeals
system objectives. Administrative appeals can open decisionmaking
3. See Hearings I, supra note 1, at 63 (testimony of Kevin Kirchner, Sierra Club
Legal Defense Fund).
4. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,444 (1992) (proposed Mar. 26, 1992).
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to public challenge, clarify a record, and apply a substantive stan-
dard of review in ways that courts will not. In addition, an ad-
ministrative process can better tailor review to the agency's mission
and manage conflicts more cheaply and quickly than courts. More
importantly, these appeals reforms will reinvigorate the century-old
concept most often labeled "sustained yield" management but
today frequently called "sustainable development." 5 By whatever
name, the cultivation of resource management solutions based on
this sustainability principle becomes ever more urgent as more
people make more intensive demands on natural resources.
Part I of the article presents a comprehensive description of
the Forest Service appeals controversy. It first places the appeals
process in the context of overall national forest planning and argues
that appeals should be viewed as an integral part of overall man-
agement rather than as an epilogue to planning. Part I then details
appeals reforms of 1983 and 1989, and brings the appeals contro-
versy up to date by describing changes proposed by the Bush
Administration in 1992 and the congressional response.6
Part II considers the role of the courts in the appeals process,
and demonstrates that administrative appeals reform must construc-
tively account for the strengths and weaknesses of judicial review.
In particular, administrative appeals must anticipate problems that
have frustrated meaningful review of Forest Service decisions:
standing, supplementation of the administrative record, and stan-
dard of review. Part II also analyzes the important judicial cases
involving appeals of Land and Resource Management Plans and
discusses project-level challenges that raised legal issues relating to
the role of appeals.
Part III describes our proposal for reforming administrative
appeals. First it articulates the reasons why the Forest Service should
employ the sustainability principle as a substantive standard of
review in administrative appeals. The sustainability principle incor-
porates the specific statutes, regulations, and policies with which
5. The concept of sustained yield has its roots in Gifford Pinchot's vision for the
Forest Service and his interpretation of the Organic Act of 1897. See GIFFORD PINCHOT,
BREAKINo NEw GROUND 260-62 (1947). Subsequent statutory developments in the sustained
yield concept include the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 529,
531(b) (1988), and the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 1611
(1988). The 1987 Brundtland Commission report popularized the term "sustainable devel-
opment." WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
8 (1987).
6. As of January 1993, the Clinton Administration has not yet weighed in on the
appeals issue.
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the Forest Service must comply. Through consistent application of
the principle, the proposed board of forest appeals can develop
useful precedent, breathing new life into the sustainability idea and
implementing statutory provisions that courts are hesitant to en-
force. Second, Part III details how a board of forest appeals would
decide appeals. Borrowing procedural elements from both Forest
Service and Department of the Interior experiments in appeals
management and allowing for realistic compromise between appel-
lants and the agency, the independent appeals board would be a
hardy amalgam.
In Part IV, we describe three categories of objectives that can
be used to evaluate an administrative appeals system. By considering
the wisdom of resource management decisions that the system
promotes, the efficiency of the process, and the legitimacy of the
overall system, we evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of our
proposed appeals system. An Appendix briefly describes the Interior
Board of Land Appeals and the Bureau of Land Management
protest procedure. Two Tables (following the Appendix) summarize
the appeals procedures discussed in the article.
I. THE FOREST SERVICE APPEALS CONTROVERSY
The Forest Service has provided some type of administrative
appeals process since 1906. 7 In the early years, appeals procedures
were set out in agency manuals and "use" books given to field
officers.' These procedures were codified for the first time in 1936. 9
Appeals under the 1936 rule were fairly straightforward, and al-
lowed administrative decisions of Forest Service line officers to be
reviewed by their superior officers, the basic model for appeals
through the 1980s.10 Appeals could be brought by those having
written authorization to occupy and use national forest lands, those
having contracts with the agency, and those having a general interest
in national forest management." Before the passage of the National
7. The history of administrative appeals within the Forest Service is discussed in
Ann A. Loose, Forest Plan Appeal Decisions: Guides to the Future of the U.S. Forest
Service, WESTERN WILDLANDS, Winter 1989, at 2; see also 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310-11 (1988).
8. 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310 (1988).
9. Regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture Relating to the Protection, Occupancy,
Use, and Administration of the National Forests, 1 Fed. Reg. 1090 (1936).
10. Loose, supra note 7, at 2.
11. 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310 (1988).
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),12 this appeals process was the
primary mechanism for challenging management decisions of the
Forest Service. 3
Between 1936 and 1983, the Forest Service revised its appeals
rules a number of times. In some variations of the rules, appeals
were limited to decisions involving contractors and holders of writ-
ten instruments with the agency.' 4 At other times, appeals were
more broadly available to members of the general public, though
they were rarely used by the public to challenge management
decisions. 5 The appeals process also alternated between a system
of review within the agency line officer hierarchy and a system of
independent review by an external appeals board. Between 1965
and 1974, for example, appeals were heard by the Board of Forest
Appeals, an adjudicatory body independent of the Forest Service.' 6
But since that time, the agency has retained an internal appeals
process involving review of an officer's decisions by the next highest
line officer. In 1988 the Forest Service explained "that it was more
administratively comfortable" with this form of review than with
the use of an independent board of appeals. 7 Unfortunately, the
administrative comfort of the Forest Service has not always placed
appellants at ease.
Over the past decade, the Forest Service appeals program has
been embroiled in controversy and transfigured by repeated change.
12. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c
(1988)). NEPA requires, inter alia, a detailed statement of environmental impacts (EIS) of
and alternatives to proposed "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. ... 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988).
13. See 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310 (1988).
14. See Loose, supra note 7, at 2.
15. See id.
16. The kind of grievances heard by the appeals board "largely concerned contractual
issues raised by parties holding a permit or other written instrument with the Forest Service."
NFS REPORT CONCERNING REQUIRED REviEw OF 36 C.F.R. 211.18, SECRETARY'S ADMINIS-
TRATIVE APPEAL REGULATION 2 (Mar. 27, 1987, rev. May 7).
17. See 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310, 17,311 (1988). As the Forest Service put it:
[Tihe history and nature of [independent review] boards is that they require
highly structured, formalized rules of procedure which complicate, rather than
simplify, an appeals process. Such complexity is not in the best interest of those
appellants who lack the resources to hire legal representation. Moreover, such
formalized processes may intensify adversarial relationships with the agency whose
decisions are being reviewed and ruled on. Such a relationship is counter to the
Forest Service commitment and desire to increase communication and cooperation
with the public. In addition, an external board could erode the agency's statutory
authority to administer its programs and to supervise, correct, or redirect oper-
ations.
Id. at 17,314.
FOREST SERVICE APPEAL REFORM
Before turning to this stormy history, it will be helpful to place
the appeals program in the broader context of forest planning.
A. National Forest Planning and Decisionmaking: The
Context of Appeals
The Forest Service's conservation tradition involves both pro-
duction and restoration goals. Professor Charles Wilkinson and H.
Michael Anderson link these goals to two kinds of planning that
evolved within the Forest Service: utilitarian and protective. I" Util-
itarian planning, initially employed to promote efficient timber
harvests, focuses on maximizing the value of public resource use.
Protective planning, originally adopted to control overgrazing, con-
centrates on restricting use to maintain the integrity of resources.
These two strains of planning that trace back to the turn of the
century still characterize the land use debate ventilated in appeals
today. '9
Although some effort was made to coordinate management in
national forests, most planning prior to the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 196020 proceeded resource by resource. 2' Then, in 1961,
the Forest Service began to address resource use conflicts by pre-
paring regional guides and requiring each ranger district to prepare
a Multiple-Use Management Plan which classified lands into the
zones specified in the guides. 22 These plans were replaced in 1973
with Unit Plans, which were intended to satisfy NEPA require-
ments, but which did not necessarily correspond with ranger dis-
tricts. 23 Although they incorporated a wider variety of zones and
more detailed management guidelines than the Multiple-Use Man-
agement Plans, the Unit Plans continued the focus on zoning for
permissible uses.2
18. Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in
the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 22 (1985).
19. Although production and restoration goals may conflict, they both are justified
by the conservation ethos of Gifford Pinchot and the early Forest Service. Preservationist
goals, though often consistent with restoration, are motivated by a different, competing
philosophy of public resource management most often associated with John Muir. See
STEPHEN Fox, THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT: JOHN MUIR AND His LEGACY,
111-15, 121 (1981); RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND, 134-138 (rev.
ed. 1973).
20. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1988)).
21. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 29.
22. Id. at 31-32.
23, Id. at 33-34.
24. Id. at 34.
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In 1974, Congress for the first time mandated national forest
planning when it passed the Resources Planning Act (RPA).25 The
RPA requires a service-wide, national perspective that forms the
first tier of forest planning. Under the RPA program, the Forest
Service prepares a national report every ten years to assess the
renewable resources on its lands, 26 every five years to propose long-
range strategic objectives for its activities, 27 and annually to evaluate
its progress toward the five-year objectives.28
When Congress again mandated Forest Service action in 1976,
it called for the replacement of Unit Plans with the second tier of
forest planning, the Land and Resource Management Plans
(LRMPs). 29 The National Forest Management Act (NFMA) 0 revised
the organic legislation for the Forest Service in response to mount-
ing pressure to open up the planning process and to a court decision
prohibiting the practice of clearcutting. 3' The LRMPs are often
called "forest plans" because their geographic scope usually cor-
responds to a single national forest. These plans generally are
prepared for ten-year cycles, but may be amended when conditions
or RPA plans change.12 The forest plans contain a summary of the
current resource management situation, a description of the multiple
use goals and objectives for the forest, prescriptions and associated
standards and guidelines for each management area zoned in the
plan, and monitoring requirements that can be used to evaluate
implementation of the plan." Like Euclidian zoning, forest plans
prohibit certain uses within areas of the forest but permissible uses
may or may not occur. The NFMA and its implementing regulations
also provide for public participation in the preparation of forest
plans through such means as notice, public meetings, the dissemi-
nation of information, and requests for written comments.3 4
The Forest Service planning regulations provide for interaction
between these first two tiers of planning. The effects of proposed
25. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, Pub. L. No. 93-378,
88 Stat. 476 (1974) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1601 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1602 (1988 & Supp. II1 1991).
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1606 (1988).
29. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
30. Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (1976) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1988
& Supp. III 1991)).
31. West Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945
(4th Cir. 1975).
32. The life of some plans may extend 15 years. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(g) (1992).
33. Id. § 219.11.
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d) (1988); 36 C.F.R. § 219.6 (1992).
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LRMP alternatives are estimated, compared, and evaluated by an
interdisciplinary team.3 The regional forester may then mediate any
differences between the RPA objectives allocated to the region and
the cumulative resources projected to be produced by the individual
forest plans within the region.36 Approval of a LRMP is the decision
of the regional forester."
Specific projects implementing the LRMPs represent the third
tier of forest planning. Timber sales, special use permits, grazing
allotments, and leases are all actions that, before they can be
approved, require more site-specific information than the LRMP
provides. The LRMP may authorize these activities in a part of a
national forest but they cannot actually occur without the Forest
Service deciding on a case-by-case basis whether they are appro-
priate. The Forest Service relies heavily on the NEPA process to
conduct its analysis for both project decisions and revisions of
LRMPs. These last two tiers, LRMPs and project decisions, are
the most contentious and are the tiers subject to administrative
appeal.
.Other important actions that drive national forest management
do not fit squarely into any one of the three tiers. For instance,
regional guides that set out standards and guidelines are used by
the individual forests in preparing LRMPs, but apply to all forests
within the region. These guides probably fall somewhere in between
the RPA and LRMP tiers. Similarly, congressional appropriations
set targets for commodity production that are as broad as RPA
objectives, but that are exogenous to the Forest Service.3"
B. The 1983 Appeals Rule
1. Coverage and Levels of Review
The 1983 appeals rule, like its predecessor from 1974, relied
on a procedure allowing anyone who disagreed with a line officer's
decision to file an appeal with the officer's superior.3 9 There were
35. 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(g)-(h) (1992).
36. For a discussion of the role of the regional forester in reconciling RPA top-down
objectives with LRMP goals, see Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 79-81.
37. 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(c) (1992).
38. See, e.g., FS: No Spotted Owl Solution in 1993; Murrelet Threatens, PUBLIC
LANDS NEWS, Oct. 15, 1992, at 3.
39. See 36 C.F.R. § 211.18 (1988). Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the
1983 appeals rule will be to the 1988 Code of Federal Regulations, the final codification
of the 1983 rule before revision in 1989.
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no formal standing requirements, and anyone objecting to an of-
ficer's decision could file an appeal. Appeals were initiated by filing
a notice of appeal with the deciding officer within forty-five days
of the decisionA0 After the initial appeal, the appellant was entitled
to a second level of appeal at the next highest level within the
Forest Service's line of authority. 41
2. Proceedings
The "statement of reasons" was the major substantive docu-
ment submitted by the appellant. It presented the factual and legal
basis for the appeal 2.4  Unless the agency granted an extension, the
statement of reasons was subject to the same time limitation as the
notice of appeal-it had to be submitted within forty-five days
after the decision being appealed. Extensions could be granted "for
good cause shown by the Applicant. ' 4 The Forest Service Appeals
Handbook defined "good cause" as "a reason beyond the control
40. Id. § 211.18(c)(1). The notice of appeal identified the decision under appeal, the
decision date, the line officer who made the decision, how the appellant was affected by
the decision, and the relief desired. Id. § 211.18(e). The time period for filing the notice
of appeal could not be extended for any reason. Id. § 211.18(d).
When a decision affected a written instrument issued by the Forest Service, the rule
required that written notice of the appeal be provided to the parties to the instrument. For
others, notification of the appeal was provided through publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. See id. § 211.18(a)(2)-(3). Certain kinds of actions were excluded from
the appeals process, including decisions covered by the Contract Disputes Act, decisions
involving FOIA denials, and other categories of decisions. See id. § 211.18(b). These
categories of decisions remain excluded under the current appeals procedure.
41. The two-level appeals process varied slightly depending on the position of the
initial decisionmaker.
-An initial decision by a district ranger, such as timber sale, was appealed to the forest
supervisor, with a second appeal as of right to the regional forester. Id. § 211.18(f)(1)(i).
-An initial decision by a forest supervisor, such as an amendment to a forest plan,
was appealed to the regional forester, with a second.appeal as of right to the Chief of the
Forest Service. Id. § 211.18(f)(l)(ii).
-An initial decision by a regional forester, such as the approval of a forest plan, was
appealed to the Chief. Id. § 211.18(f)(l)(iii). Because the Chief is the highest line officer,
there was no second appeal as of right after the Chief's decision in the first appeal. The
Chief's appeal decisions, however, were automatically directed to the Secretary of Agricul-
ture for discretionary review. Id. § 211.18(f)(2).
-An initial decision of the Chief, such as the approval of a regional guide, was appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture. Id. § 211.18(f)(l)(iv). If the Secretary failed to take action
on the case within 10 days of receiving the appeal, the appeal was automatically denied.
Id. § 211.18(f)(4)
42. The regulations did not provide substantive guidance regarding what the statements
of reasons should contain. In practice, they were typically structured like summary judgment
briefs.
43. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(d)(2) (1988).
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of the requestor."'4' Extensions of time were commonly filed and
granted at the time appellants submitted their notice of appeal 5.4
Within thirty days after receiving the appellant's statement of
reasons, the deciding officer was required to prepare a responsive
statement.4 This was the major substantive document filed by the
deciding officer. The Appeals Handbook provided that the respon-
sive statement "must clearly respond to each reason, or issue,
presented in the statement of reasons, and should reflect legal,
technical and administrative consideration of matters raised in the
statement of reasons. ' 47 The responsive statement was sent to all
parties to the appeal.48
The appellant could submit a "concise reply" to the responsive
statement under the 1983 rules. The reply'was due within twenty
days after the mailing date of the responsive statement. Upon
receipt of the appellant's reply (or at the end of the twenty-day
reply period) the deciding officer sent the appeal record to the
reviewing officer 9
Any party or intervenor could request an oral presentation
before the reviewing officer. This request was also due within forty-
five days after the underlying decision, and was usually included
with the notice of appeal. Oral presentations were strikingly infor-
mal, and the procedures were established by the reviewing officer.
The reviewing officer was required to rule on requests for oral
presentation within ten days after receiving the appeal record from
the deciding officer. The Appeals Handbook described the purpose
and nature of the oral presentation as follows:
The objective of an oral presentation is to allow appellants and
intervenors to provide their viewpoints and information to clarify
the record. The reviewing officer determines the procedures
appropriate for an oral presentation, including: the use of tape
recorders, allowing for presentation by parties to the appeal in
person or by telephone, and allowing for the deciding officer
[whose decision is being appealed] to be present. However, since
44. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, PUB. No. FSH 1509.12,
APPEALS HANDBOOK § 2.32b (1986) [hereinafter APPEALS HANDBOOK].
45. According to the Wilderness Society's 1985 Handbook, How to Appeal a Forest
Plan, another 45 days was "a reasonable period of time to request for the extension." Id.
at 20. The same rule for extensions applied to oral presentations, replies to the deciding
officer's responsive statement, and comments following the oral presentation. 36 C.F.R.
§ 211.18(d)(2) (1988).
46. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(g) (1988).
47. APPEALS HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 2.41.
48. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(g) (1988).
49. Id.
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this is not intended as an adversary type of hearing, the deciding
officer would be present only to provide information. Further,
the reviewing officer may allow all parties to exchange questions
and comments. In short, the reviewing officer may prescribe
whatever procedures deemed necessary, so long as they (1) are
consistent with the regulations and Forest Service policy; (2)
allow the concerns of all parties to be heard; and (3) provide a
complete appeal record.50
After the record had been received by the reviewing officer,
and after the oral presentation, if any, the parties had a period of
time to supplement the record with additional information.5 After
this period, the appeals record was closed. According to the 1983
rules, the record consisted of "a distinct set of identifiable docu-
ments directly concerning the appeal, including, but not limited to,
notices of appeal, comments, statements of reasons, responsive
statements, procedural determinations, correspondence, summaries
of oral presentations and related documents, appeal decisions, and
other information the Reviewing Officer may consider necessary to
reach a decision." 52 If the reviewing officer considered the record
to be inadequate, he or she could suspend the appeal to request
additional information, or remand the case to the deciding officer
with instructions for further action. 53
3. Intervention and Stays
Other persons or organizations could participate in the appeal
either through formal intervention or by submitting comments for
the record. Formal intervention was discretionary with the reviewing
officer, and the regulations required the intervenor to have "an
immediate interest in the subject of an appeal . . . . ,4 If interven-
tion was granted, the intervenor enjoyed the same rights as the
original appellant, and could advance the appeal forward to the
next level if the original appellant dropped the case. Intervenors
50. APPEALS HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 2.64.
51. Supplemental information had to be submitted within 10 days after the reviewing
officer received the record. Other parties to the appeal then had 20 days to respond to the
supplemental information. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(p) (1988).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 211.18(q).
54. Id. § 211.18(l)(1). The agency's Appeals Handbook directed the reviewing officer
to consider the following factors in determining intervention requests: (a) evidence that the
intervenor can provide new information on issues raised by the appellant; (b) the nature
of the intervenor's immediate interest in the appeal, such as how the intervenor might be
aggrieved or adversely affected by the outcome; and (c) any unnecessary delay that might
result from the intervention. See APPEALS HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 2.51(2).
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could not assert new issues not raised by the original appellant,
however. As an alternative to intervention, any person or organi-
zation could submit written comments for the record."
A stay of the underlying decision was available at any time
during the first level of appeal.5 6 However, a stay was "considered
only if the Appellant submits information explaining what the
Appellant wants stopped and why." ' 57 Yet the Appeals Handbook
established a clear presumption in favor of granting stays: "As a
general rule, requests for a stay should be granted unless such a
stay would cause considerable harm to Forest Service management
activities or have a direct adverse effect on the rights of other
parties. "58 If granted, the stay remained in effect for ten days after
the decision in the original appeal. Decisions on stays were them-
selves appealable.5 9
4. Decision
The reviewing officer's decision could be based only on the
closed record, and, according to the regulations, "should be made
within 30 days of the date the record is closed."' 0 The reviewing
officer could extend this time if necessary. 6' Although the regula-
tions did not provide a standard of review, the Appeals Handbook
stated that "correctness" was the proper standard. 62
The procedures governing a second appeal as of right were the
same as those governing the initial appeal, and required a new
notice of appeal, a new statement of reasons and responsive state-
ment, and so forth. 63 The "reviewing officer" of the original appeal
55. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(k) (1988).
56. Id. § 211.18(h).
57. Id.
58. APPEALs HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 2.42a(5).
59. 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(o) (1988).
60. Id. § 211.18(r).
61. Id.
62. APPEALS HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 2.94. According to this provision:
The reviewing officer makes the decision based on the facts presented in the
appeal record. The reviewing officer should analyze the case with objectivity to
avoid being influenced by the previous actions taken by the deciding officer. It
is not sufficient merely to determine from the record that the deciding officer
made no clear errors on legal, factual, or policy matters. Rather, the reviewing
officer must apply independent judgment and decide, based on the record, whether
the deciding officer made a correct decision.
Id.
63. Any stay, however, expired 10 days after the decision in the original appeal. The
stay could not be renewed or refiled in the second appeal. See 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(h)
(1988).
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simply became the "deciding officer" for the purposes of the second
appeal. Where the first appeal was decided by the Chief, however,
the Chief automatically sent his appeal decision to the Secretary of
Agriculture without the need for a new notice of appeal. If the
Secretary decided to accept the case for review, the Secretary could
adopt the procedures which would govern the review, and would
not be bound by the requirements of 36 C.F.R. section 211.18.64
C. The 1989 Appeals Rule
1. The Decision to Change Course
In 1987 the Forest Service formed an "Appeals Regulation
Review Team" to conduct a service-wide review of the 1983 ad-
ministrative appeals rule. 65 The team visited various regional offices
and national forests and interviewed approximately 160 Forest Serv-
ice employees. The agency also published a Federal Register notice
requesting public comments on the appeals process, and it mailed
notices to potentially interested individuals and groups. The Federal
Register notice and the letters were fairly vague about how the
Forest Service expected to revise the appeals rules. The Federal
Register announcement, for instance, indicated that the agency was
"interested in hearing" about the appeals process, and was "par-
ticularly interested in how well the process meets current needs and
is likely to meet future needs" and "what the public likes and
dislikes about it." 66 The agency received about 200 letters in re-
sponse.
The Forest Service published a proposed revision of the appeals
system in May 1988.67 In a nutshell, the agency proposed to retain
the old appeals process for one class of appeals and create a new
process for all other classes. The old procedures (with minor revi-
sions) would apply to disputes involving written instruments that
authorized occupancy and use of Forest System lands. New
"streamlined" procedures would apply to all other decisions, in-
cluding challenges to forest plans and project decisions, which then
constituted about eighty-five percent of all appeals.
64. Id. § 211.18(0(5).
65. The Appeals Regulation Review Team consisted of seven Forest Service officials-
five from regional offices and two from the Washington Office.
66. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,348 (1987).
67. See 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310 (1988).
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The Forest Service decided to change the appeals rules based
on seven "findings" of the review team. To summarize, the team
found that
1. The public believed that the appeals procedures, although im-
portant, were "cumbersome, inconvenient, expensive, too tech-
nical, and too legalistic."
2. The old process was adjudicatory in nature, and thus better
suited to the resolution of particular grievances than the review
of policies and operational decisions.
3. The old process was time-consuming and expensive.
4. Appeals of plans and projects "may have been legislated into
obsolescence" by NEPA and NFMA, which provided opportu-
nities for public involvement earlier in the decisionmaking proc-
ess. Appeals therefore were a form of "redundant" public
participation.
5. Many appeals resulted from miscommunication between the
agency and appellants. These misunderstandings could have been,
but were not, resolved before appeals were filed.
6. Appeals were abused by the public to delay projects, siphoning
resources "from resource management to process management."
7. The public believed that appeals under the old rule were biased
against appellants .68
Finding number 4 is particularly revealing about the agency's
attitude toward administrative appeals. According to that finding,
post-decision appeals serve the same purposes as pre-decision pro-
cedures for public participation. In the years before the public
regularly participated in agency decisionmaking, administrative ap-
peals served as the only means by which the public could challenge
agency decisions. After NEPA, however, the public was heard at
earlier stages of the process. In this view, NEPA "legislated into
obsolescence" the need for administrative appeals. 69 As the agency
put it, "[diecisions that have been thoroughly analyzed, docu-
mented, and subjected to public participation under provisions of
these statutes are habitually recycled through the appeals process,
giving the public, as it were, redundant opportunities to object to
a single decision." 70
68. See id. at 17,312-13.
69. Public participation, however, had been an integral component of Forest Service
decisionmaking well before NEPA. See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER
102-07, 153-55 (1960).
70. 53 Fed. Reg. 17,313 (1988). This finding appears to characterize administrative
appeals as offering merely a "second bite of the apple" without any purpose beyond
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In proposing the new two-track appeals system, the Forest
Service indicated that it had rejected a number of other options.
These included revising the old process in minor respects, stream-
lining all appeals under a new unitary system, and eliminating the
appeals process altogether. An interesting choice made by the agency
was its decision to retain what it considered to be the old "cum-
bersome" procedures for certain types of appeals. The agency made
this decision, it said, because "those appellants who have a legal
relationship with the Forest Service through a written instrument
or authorization would be short-changed by a new appeal process
that provides few procedural or 'due process' requirements." '71
The Forest Service received over one thousand comments on
the proposed revisions to the appeals process. In January of 1989,
it published a final rule.72 Despite opposition to the proposed two-
track system by many commenters, the final rule retained this
system. Streamlined appeal procedures were instituted for decisions
documented under NEPA and NFMA, including LRMPs and pro-
ject decisions. 7 The appeals procedures under the 1983 amendments
were retained for appealing decisions involving written instruments
authorizing use and occupancy of National Forest System lands. 74
The preamble to the final rule reiterated the agency's view
about the purpose of forest appeals. Part 217 gives interested
individuals "one more opportunity, following and in addition to
their input during the planning process, to seek agency oversight
and reconsideration at a higher level. ' ' 71 Here again the agency
asserted that administrative appeals are just another type of "public
participation" identical to the pre-decision public involvement op-
portunities provided by NEPA. Indeed, in the agency's view, post-
decision appeals are less important than pre-decision participation:
"we believe that public participation and involvement in planning
and decisionmaking is more effective prior to making the actual
decision than afterwards." 76 This conclusion appears to be the prime
justification for streamlining the appeals procedures under Part
217. If appeals offer merely a second, less important opportunity
recycling stale objections raised during the NEPA process. According to the agency, "[t]he
issue is 'how many hurdles must be cleared before management decisions may be imple-
mented?.' Id.
71. Id. at 17,314.
72. 54 Fed. Reg. 3342 (1989).
73. These procedures are codified at 36 C.F.R. § 217 (1992).
74. These procedures are codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.80-.101, Subpart C (1992).
75. 54 Fed. Reg. 3342, 3343 (1989).
76. Id. at 3344.
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for public involvement in forest planning, it makes sense not to
overburden appeals with excessive "due process."
2. The Final Rule
The important elements of the January 1989 rule are described
below.
a. Coverage and Levels of Review
The final Part 217 rule applied to "written decisions governing
plans, projects, and activities to be carried out on the National
Forest System that result from analysis, documentation, and other
requirements of [NEPA and NFMAJ, and the implementing regu-
lations, policies, and procedures .... "-7 Only those decisions doc-
umented in a "Decision Memo, Decision Notice, or Record of
Decision" could be appealed. Thus Part 217 did not apply to
preliminary decisions made before the release of final plans and
other decision documents. 78 Notice of decisions by the Chief are
published in the Federal Register, and notice of other decisions are
published in news articles of general circulation. 79
Part 217 eliminated the availability of two levels of review.
Except for initial decisions of district rangers, a second level of
review is discretionary under Part 217. Many commenters objected
to this change, arguing that it would lead to cursory review,
discourage negotiated settlements, and promote increased litigation.
The agency concluded, however, that single-level review "best fits
the intent" of the new rule:
It simplifies the process, improves the potential to process ap-
peals in a timely manner, yet retains the option for a second
review. Inherent in the process is the requirement for full and
proper use of the NEPA process. The NEPA process requires
Federal agencies to involve the public early and continuously
throughout the decisionmaking process; thus a fair and open
77. 36 C.F.R. § 217.3(a) (1992).
78. Id. § 217.3(a)(1). As under the prior rule, Part 217 excluded several categories
of decisions, including FOIA denials, decisions covered by the Contract Disputes Act, and
personnel matters. Id. § 217.4.,Added to this list of exclusions were "[decisions related
to rehabilitation of National Forest Service lands and recovery of forest resources resulting
from natural disasters .. .when [a regional forester or the Chief determines] that good
cause exists to exempt such decisions from review under this part." Id. § 217.4(11).
According to the agency, this new exclusion reflected "the agency's experience with the
devastating forest fire season of 1987 .... 53 Fed. Reg. 17,320 (1988).
79. 36 C.F.R. § 217.5 (1992).
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hearing on issues related to a decision are [sic) available. Lastly,
the intent of a rule is dispute resolution by establishing stronger
ties between the initial decisionmaker and the public, all in the
overall interest of making better National Forest management
decisions. 0
Recent congressional action has removed project-level de-
cisions from the Part 217 appeals process.8 ' Part 217 procedures,
however, still apply to appeals of LRMPs.
b. Proceedings
To commence an appeal under Part 217, a person must file a
"notice of appeal" with the reviewing officer (rather than with the
deciding officer as under the 1983 rule).8 2 The notice of appeal has
to be filed within forty-five days of "project decisions or non-
significant amendments to land and resource management plans,"
and within ninety days of "land and resource management plan
approvals, significant amendments, or revisions, and for other
programmatic decisions documented in a Record of Decision." 3
80. 54 Fed. Reg. 3348 (1989). In response to public comments, the agency did retain
two levels of review for initial decisions of district rangers. See id.
The appeals process under part 217 can be summarized as follows:
-An initial decision by a district ranger, such as a timber sale, is appealed as of right
to the forest supervisor, with the opportunity for a second appeal to the regional forester.
36 C.F.R. § 217.7(c) (1992). But unlike the second appeal under the 1983 rule, review is
based only on the existing record with no opportunity for additional submissions. There is
no discretionary review after the second appeal. Id. § 217.7(e)(3).
-An initial decision by a forest supervisor, such as an amendment to a forest plan, is
appealed as of right to the regional forester. Id. § 217.7(b)(1). After the regional forester's
appeal decision, the Chief has discretionary review. d. § 217.7(e)(1).
-An initial decision by a regional forester, such as the approval of a forest plan, is
appealed as of right to the Chief. Id. § 217.7(b)(2). After the Chief's appeal decision, the
Secretary of Agriculture has discretionary review. Id. § 217.7(e)(2).
-An initial decision by the Chief, such as the approval of a regional guide, is appealed
to the Secretary of Agriculture. This appeal is discretionary. If the Secretary does not
decide to review the case within 15 days, the appeal is automatically denied. Id. § 217.7(a).
The 1989 rule does not affect the levels of review available for appeals of forest plans. As
under the 1983 rule, there is a single appeal as of right to the Chief, followed by discretionary
review by the Secretary of Agriculture. Compare 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(f)(1)(iii), (f)(2) (1988)
with 36 C.F.R. § 217.7(b)(2), (e)(2) (1992).
81. See discussion infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
82. As originally promulgated, Part 217 required the notice of appeal to be filed with
both the reviewing officer and the deciding officer. Failure to comply with this "dual
filing" requirement resulted in dismissal of the appeal. See 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(a)(1) (1990).
The agency eliminated the "dual filing" requirement in February 1991. See 56 Fed. Reg.
4914 (1991). As amended, § 217.8(a)(1) requires duplicate copies of the notice of appeal
to be filed with the reviewing officer, who then sends one of the copies to the deciding
officer.
83. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(a)(2)-(3) (1992).
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The notice of appeal must set forth the appellant's arguments
in the case. 4 Part 217 eliminated the opportunity to file a subse-
quent "statement of reasons"-the appellant's main substantive
document under the 1983 rule. Under Part 217, all arguments have
to be provided in the notice of appeal, subject to the time limitations
indicated above. Also eliminated under Part 217 are the deciding
officer's "responsive statement" and the appellant's opportunity to
reply to the responsive statement. Instead, the deciding officer must
prepare a response to "indicate where the [decision] documentation
addresses the issues raised in the notice of appeal." 85 The deciding
officer is required to transmit the pertinent records within thirty
days of receiving a copy of the notice of appeal. This period cannot
be extended. 6
There is no opportunity for oral presentations under the final
rule. Notwithstanding a few exceptions, the record closes either
when the intervenors' comments are received or when the deciding
officer transmits the appeals record.17
c. Intervention and Stays
As originally proposed, the 1989 rule would have eliminated
intervention. The agency explained "that providing all the 'formal'
embellishments of intervention is unnecessary and counterproduc-
tive to achieving the initial goals of offering a separate, less formal
process for review of management decisions. '"88 But after receiving
many negative comments on this proposed change, the agency
reinstated a "streamlined" form of intervention in the final version
of Part 217.89 Under the final intervention rule, requests to intervene
are accepted if received within twenty days after the filing of the
first level appeal. 90 Intervenors can submit comments on issues
84. Id. § 217.9. This section provides:
(a) It is the responsibility of those who appeal a decision under this part to
provide a Reviewing Officer sufficient narrative evidence and argument to show
why the decision by the lower level officer should be changed or reversed.
(b) At a minimum, a written notice of appeal filed with the Reviewing Officer
must:
(6) State the reasons for objecting, including issues of fact, law, regulation, or
policy, and, if applicable, specifically how the decision violates law, regulation,
or policy . . ..
85. Id. § 217.15(b).
86. Id. § 217.15(a).
87. Id. § 217.15(e).
88. 54 Fed. Reg. 3347 (1989).
89. See 36 C.F.R. § 217.14 (1992).
90. Id.
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raised in the notice of appeal, receive and comment on additional
information (if it is requested by the reviewing officer), and par-
ticipate in meetings to negotiate a resolution. 9' In contrast to the
1983 rule, intervenors cannot intervene at any time, request a stay,
or continue the case if the original appellant withdraws the appeal. 92
There have been problems with intervention under Part 217.
Intervenors complained that there were no reliable means for learn-
ing that an appeal had been filed. 93 This caused them to miss the
twenty-day time limitation for intervention. Even if they made the
deadline, twenty days did not leave them time to prepare adequate
comments.94 In October 1990, the agency published a proposed rule
to address this problem.95 This proposal would require reviewing
officers to provide a list of pending appeals for any specific decision
to anyone requesting it. The rule would also allow intervenors to
submit comments within fifty days from the close of the appeal
period .%
Implementation of a decision is automatically delayed for seven
days following publication of the notice of decision. 97 After that,
an appellant can request a stay of actions, which would be imple-
mented before the appeal decision is issued. The appellant has to
file a written request for a stay with the reviewing officer, specifying
the adverse effects of the activity on the appellant, the harmful
impacts of the activity on resources in the area, and how these
effects and impacts would prevent a meaningful decision on the
merits. 9 In deciding the stay request, the reviewing officer consid-
ers:
(1) Information provided by the requester . . . ; (2) The effect
that granting the stay would have on preserving a meaningful
appeal on the merits; (3) Any information provided by the
Deciding Officer or other party to the appeal in response to the
stay request; (4) Any other factors the Reviewing Officer con-
siders relevant to the decision."
The reviewing officer is required to issue a written decision on a
stay request within ten days.' °° The stay decision is not subject to
91., Id.
92. Id.
93. See 55 Fed. Reg, 41,357 (1990) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 217).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 41,358.
97. 36 C.F.R. § 217.10(a) (1992).
98. Id. § 217.10(d)(3)(ii)(A), (B), (C).
99. Id. § 217.10(f).
100. Id. § 217.10(e).
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discretionary review at the next level, unless the reviewing officer
is a forest supervisor reviewing a decision of a district ranger.'0 '
d. Decision
Time limitations for deciding an appeal are calculated from
the date of filing of the notice of appeal. The relevant time periods
are 100 days for project decisions, 160 days for land and resource
management plan approvals, amendments, and revisions, or pro-
grammatic decisions documents in a Record of Decision, and thirty
days for second-level appeals of a district ranger's decision. 0 2 These
time periods can be extended by the reviewing officer to request
additional information from the parties, or to allow for negotia-
tion. 103
The 1989 rule also eliminated the substantive review standard
of "correctness." Instead of providing a standard to evaluate the
decision being appealed, the 1989 rule merely states that the appeal
decision itself "must be consistent with applicable law, regulations,
and orders."' °
e. Discretionary Second-Level Appeals
Where a second level of discretionary review is available, the
reviewing officer is required to forward copies of the decision and
decision documents to the next highest line officer within one day
after rendering the appeal decision. 05 The higher level officer has
101. Id. § 217.10(i). As originally proposed, Part 217 would have made stays automatic
unless the reviewing officer determined that there was "an urgent, compelling need to
proceed with the project." Appeal of Decisions Concerning the National Forest System, 53
Fed. Reg. 17,310, 17,325 (1988). In comments, however, "[m]any respondents pointed to
a dual standard because in 36 C.F.R. Part 251 the appellant has to justify the request for
stay while under 36 C.F.R. Part 217 the government is required to justify not granting a
delay request." Appeal of Decisions Concerning the National Forest System, 54 Fed. Reg.
3342, 3349 (1989). In response to these "dual standard" complaints, the agency placed the
burden of justifying a stay on the appellant in both situations.
102. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(f) (1992).
103. Id. § 217.13(c). Unlike the 1983 rule, Part 217 makes explicit the authority of
the deciding officer to conduct negotiations during an appeal:
When a decision is appealed, appellants or intervenors may request meetings with
the Deciding Officer to discuss the appeal, either together or separately, to narrow
issues, agree on facts, and explore opportunities to resolve the issues by means
other than review and decision on the appeal. Reviewing Officers may, on their
own initiative, request the Deciding Officer to meet the participants to discuss
the appeal and explore opportunities to resolve the issues.
Id. § 217.12(a).
104. Id. § 217.16(c).
105. Id. § 217.17(b).
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fifteen days to decide whether to take the case. 1°6 If this period
expires before the officer takes action, the decision of the reviewing
officer stands as the final administrative decision of the Department
of Agriculture.1t° If the higher level officer decides to take the
appeal, he is required to conclude the review within thirty days. 08
That decision then becomes the final administrative action of the
Department.
D. The 1992 Proposal to Eliminate Project-Level Appeals
The 1989 amendments did little to quell the escalating debate
over the administrative appeals program. To the forest products
industry, unions, and timber-dependent communities in the West,
appeals had come to represent a serious obstacle to the steady flow
of timber and a main culprit in the region's economic decline.
These charges came to a head in November 1991, during a Senate
hearing on the appeals program.1 9 Several Senators, most notably
Senators Packwood" ° and Hatfield from Oregon, complained that
many administrative appeals were frivolous, designed merely to
stop or delay timber sales, and were responsible for the closure of
timber mills and the loss of jobs."' Forest Service Chief F. Dale
Robertson echoed these complaints. He estimated that between $100
and $150 million was spent each year reworking timber sales and
other projects as a result of the appeals program." 2
On March 19, 1992, Agriculture Secretary Edward Madigan
announced that the Department would revise its rules to eliminate
appeals of timber sales and other project-level decisions as one of
thirteen measures designed to ease the department's regulatory
burden on American business." 3 The proposal came as a shock to
106. Id. § 217.17(d).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 217.17(0.
109. See Hearings I, supra note 1, at 1-2.
110. At the time, Senator Packwood was sponsoring a bill which would significantly
circumscribe administrative appeals of timber sales. See Federal Land and Families Protec-
tion Act, S. 1156, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
111. See Hearings I, supra note 1, at 1-2.
112. Hearings I, supra note 1, at 25.
113. The proposal to eliminate project-level appeals is published at 57 Fed. Reg. 10,444
(1992) (proposed Mar. 26, 1992), This proposal was part of a larger deregulatory effort
launched by then President Bush during his State of the Union address in January 1992.
In the address, he announced a moratorium on new regulations and directed agencies to
revise existing rules to reduce their cost to business. Environmental regulations were a
special target of this deregulatory push. For background and discussion, see Keith Schneider,
Environment Laws are Eased by Bush as Election Nears, N.Y. TIMEs, May 20, 1992, at
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many observers, since it reversed eighty-five years of agency practice
and contradicted repeated claims by the Forest Service that the
appeals program was an integral part of the agency's decisionmak-
ing process.' 1 4
Instead of allowing administrative appeals for project-level
decisions, the agency would rely solely on a period of pre-decisional
public notice and comment." 5 Notice of each project-level decision
documented in an Environnental Assessment (EA) and Finding of
No Significant. Impact (FONSI) would be published in a newspaper
of general circulation." 6 Interested members of the public would
then have thirty days to submit comments on the proposed action.
After the close of the comment period, the responsible Forest
Service official would have twenty-one days to reach a final decision
on the project, unless further environmental analysis was necessary
or consideration of comments could not be completed within twenty-
one days." '7 Administrative appeals would be limited to final de-
cisions approving, revising, or significantly amending LRMPs." 8
The agency's rationale for cutting back on administrative ap-
peals was almost exclusively an economic one. The agency repeated
the often-voiced complaints of industry that appeals block the
supply of timber, creating economic upheaval in communities de-
pendent on the steady flow of "goods and services" from the
agency.' In addition, administrative appeals were depicted as time-
consuming, procedurally onerous, and, in many cases, "frivolous"
attempts to block projects, draining resources that could be better
spent in on-the-ground activities.' 20 Because appeals afford disgrun-
114. For example, in interviews with Forest Service employees across the country, the
1987 Appeals Regulation Review Team found that "[pirobably the comment the team heard
most often was that 'we are proud to work for an Agency that has an appeals process
and we should never seriously consider getting rid of it,"' U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL-
TURE, FOREST SERVICE, APPEALS REvIEw BRIEFING PAPER 7 (Sept. 1987). Similarly, in
proposing the 1989 amendments to the appeals rule, the agency stated: "From its infancy,
the agency has felt the need to offer some kind of process to review decisions and has
perceived such reviews as beneficial and necessary for carrying out its mission of managing
the National Forest System." 53 Fed. Reg. 17,310, 17,311 (1988).
115. As noted in the supplementary information of the proposed rule, a number of
Forest Service units already use pre-decisional notice and comment procedures in addition
to post-decisional appeals. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10,447 (1992).
116. Id. at 10,448-49 (1992) (proposed Mar. 26, 1992). Responsible Forest Service
officers would publish in the Federal Register, twice annually, a list of the principal
newspapers for public notice of project-level decisions. Id.
117. Id. at 10,447.
118. Id. at 10,446.
119. Id. at 10,445.
120. Id.
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tled parties little more than another opportunity to air their views-
an argument that was first used to justify the agency's
1989 amendments to the appeals rule-this second bite of the apple
could safely be eliminated without harming the public's ability to
influence Forest Service decisions.121
The agency neatly summed up its reasoning in a single para-
graph in the proposed rule's preamble:
The current appeal regulation adversely affects the agency's
ability to implement projects by diverting the efforts of its
workforce from on-the-ground resource management activities
to processing administrative appeals. Appeals can increase the
cost, and sometimes substantially diminish the cost-effectiveness,
of a project through the time it takes the agency to complete
an appeal, even though the original decision might ultimately be
upheld. Also, administrative appeals adversely affect jobs, fam-
ilies, and communities 'dependent upon Forest Service goods
and services.' Many communities dependent upon the National
Forests for their economic livelihood depend upon the Forest
Service being able to achieve congressionally funded programs
in mining, grazing, timber, recreation, fisheries and wildlife. The
current post-decisional appeal process creates uncertainty as to
the Forest Service's ability to deliver those goods and services,
impeding economic growth and development. Delays in delivery
of National Forest System goods and services can place the
economic viability of communities at risk. The delays arising
from the appeals process also can adversely affect the cost of
homes, Federal payments for local schools and roads, and costs
to the Federal government.' 22
The proposal ignited a firestorm of controversy. In all, the
Forest Service received more than 30,000 comments on the proposal,
perhaps a record for responses to a Department of Agriculture
proposal. 23 The comments ranged from short, handwritten expres-
sions of anguish or encouragement' 24 to long, brief-like arguments.
Not all comments were on paper. A group of about one hundred
commenters from Montana signed their names below the statement
121. Id.
122. Id. at 10,445-46.
123. Telephone Interview with Joyce Kelly, Appeals Coordinator, U.S. Forest Service,
Washington, D.C. (Jan. 22, 1993).
124. A commenter from Covington, Virginia sent a handwritten note that said simply:
"I SUPPORT THESE CHANGES IN USFS APPEAL REGULATIONS. YOU CAN NOT
DO BUSINESS WITH .29 STAMPS THAT PUT A STOP TO EVERY PROJECT. GO
FOR IT!" Letter from John R. Martin to U.S.D.A. Appeals Staff (Apr. 2, 1992) (on file
with the University of Colorado Law Review).
FOREST SERVICE APPEAL REFORM
"We Support the Proposed Appeal Regs" on a door-sized piece
of laminated pine with the agency's address burned onto the front.
Debate over the proposal was taken up by industry and envi-
ronmentalists in opinion columns, letters to the editor, and radio
and television stories across the country. The rhetoric on both sides
reflected anger and frustration. Those supporting the proposal
generally viewed administrative appeals as the leading culprit in the
economic decline of timber communities, and as a vehicle for
outsiders to manipulate Forest Service decisions at the last mo-
ment. 25 Opponents of the proposal saw it as a serious blow to the
public's ability to participate in decisions affecting public forests,
and evidence of the Bush Administration's capitulation to the short-
term demands of timber interests.' 26
The atmosphere surrounding appeals remains one where fact
is easily mixed with metaphor. It is not as if both sides of the
debate see the same set of facts but disagree about their meaning.
They appear to be looking at entirely different and contradictory
sets of assumptions. 127 Proponents of the appeals cutback frequently
cite Chief Robertson's estimate that timber sale appeals cost the
Forest Service as much as $150 million a year, and claim that
appeals tied up about thirty percent of the available supply of
timber in 1991 .,128 Supporters also characterize many of the appeals
as "frivolous," and say that the appeals program is frequently
abused by preservationists filing "29 cent appeals." 129 Opponents
125. In a representative comment, the President of the California Forestry Association
said:
For too long, the preservationists have manipulated the Forest Service - virtually
crippling the entire forest resource industry and the forest communities by mis-
using the appeals process. Now the agency may be able to recover from the
paralyzing mountain of costly appeals it has faced. The preservationists abuse
the process to delay thousands of timber sales each year. Instead of being used
as a legitimate process for citizen concern and input, they have turned the process
into a costly circus.
California Forestry Association Applauds the Bush Administration for Proposal to Limit
Appeals, BusNEss WIRE, Mar. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
126. Kevin Kirchner, a lawyer with the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, said that
"[the idea is to build a wall around [Forest Service] decisions and not have to bother with
citizens challenging them." Tom Kenworthy, Plan to Ax Timber-Sale Appeals Provokes
Letters, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 1992, at A13.
127. To establish a common pool of useful data, Professor Carl Tobias has called for
a "systematic empirical evaluation of the appeals process." Carl Tobias, Fact, Fiction, and
Forest Service Appeals, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. (forthcoming 1993). Tobias suggests that
the Administrative Conference of the United States is particularly well suited to conduct
such a study.
128. See Hearings I, supra note 1, at 25, 37.
129. See, e.g., Letters from James H. Patric to Secretary Madigan (Mar. 30, 1992)
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of the proposed appeals rule dispute these figures, claiming that
appeals in fact save money for the Forest Service by enabling it to
catch errors early in the process and correct other projects before
they are underway. 30 Conservationists point out that the agency
has not backed up its cost figures and allegations of abuse with
empirical data, suggesting that the numbers were cooked and the
accusations exaggerated. 3' Moreover, if abuse does exist, they argue
that the Forest Service has authority to dismiss groundless cases
through the dismissal provisions of the existing rule.12
The most comprehensive analyses of the appeals program were
provided by the Office of Technology Assessment and the Con-
gressional Research Service in separate reports made public in the
spring of 1992.133 The OTA report, a 206-page book critical of
Forest Service policy, concluded that "most appeals appear to be
justified" and that delays in timber sales were attributable to the
Forest Service's difficulty in complying with the appeals system
rather than to problems with the system itself. 3 4 The OTA report
stated that the appeals program "has been a valuable tool" for the
agency for a number of reasons:
It has provided an internal mechanism for clarifying the legal
requirements and for testing the soundness of decisions and the
appropriateness of current policies and procedures. In addition,
the appeals process can lead to better and more consistent
decisions by encouraging more responsibility and accountability
on the part of deciding officers. Through appeals decisions, the
and from Ed Heges to Appeals Staff, National Forest Service (Mar. 26, 1992) (on file with
the University of Colorado Law Review) (discussing Review of and Comment on National
Forest Plans and Project Decisions, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 57
Fed. Reg. 10,444 (1992)).
130. Letter from Mark M. Hubbard, Forest Projects Coordinator, Oregon Natural
Resources Council, to Appeals Staff, National Forest Service (Apr. 8, 1992) (on file with
the University of Colorado Law Review) (commenting on Review of and Comment on
National Forest Plans and Project Decisions, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, 57 Fed. Reg. 10,444 (1992)).
131. See, e.g., Stephen H. Sedam (Great Lakes Regional Vice President, National
Audubon Society), Letter to Editor, U.S. Forest Plan Would Shut Out Public, CHICAGO
TRIB., Apr. 22, 1992, at 14.
132. 36 C.F.R. § 217.11(2) (1992) (requiring the reviewing officer to dismiss an appeal
when "[tihe requested relief or change cannot be granted under law, fact, or regulation
existing when the decision was made").
133. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, PUB. No. OTA-F-505, FOR-
EST SERVICE PLANNING: ACCOMMODATING USES, PRODUCING OUTPUTS, AND SUSTAINING
ECOSYSTEMS (Feb. 1992) [hereinafter OTA REPORT]; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Pun No. 92-349A, ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS OF FOREST SERVICE TIMBER SALES (Apr. 8,
1992) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
134. OTA REPORT, supra note 133, at 97.
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agency has clarified: 1) what decisions are to be made in forest
plans, 2) the relationship between decisions made in the plans
and those made during implementation, and 3) the standards for
the environmental analyses required by NEPA. Appeals have
also helped the agency establish uniform policies to address
various issues, such as the nontimber benefits of below-cost
sales; the adequacy of a plan's timber demand analysis; and the
appropriateness of the plan's allowable sale quantity. Other
issues addressed in administrative appeals have included guidance
on management indicator species and biological diversity, and
adequacy of resource monitoring plans. Because the appeals
process has forced the agency to address and resolve novel and
complex questions under NEPA and NFMA in this first round
of plan development, revising forest plans may be easier than
preparing the initial plans. 3 '
The CRS Report took issue with several of the agency's em-
pirical assumptions about timber sale appeals. First, the report
questioned the extent to which the timber supply has been disrupted
by appeals, noting that only 10.3 percent of the agency's commercial
timber sales were affected by appeals in fiscal 1991.136 Second, the
report asserted that the agency's failure to meet its timber sale
targets in fiscal 1991 was due only in part to administrative appeals,
and that other factors, such as litigation over the spotted owl and
old-growth forests, accounted for some of the delays.'37 Adminis-
trative appeals caused the agency to miss only about five percent
of its timber targets.' Third, the report indicated that seventeen
percent of fiscal 1991 timber sale appeals were dismissed, suggesting
that the agency was already dealing with frivolous appeals in an
appropriate manner. 3 9 Fully a third of timber sale appeals in fiscal
1991 resulted in the withdrawal or remand of the sale, indicating
that these appeals were probably not frivolous.' 40 Fourth, the report
noted that most timber sale appeals were resolved in a timely
manner, averaging 3.4 months, thus casting doubt on the claim
that appeals create long delays and uncertainty in timber supplies.
4 1
Fifth, agency figures show that direct and indirect costs of timber
sale appeals total less than $3 million. 42 Sixth, the report questioned
135. Id. (citations omitted).
136. CRS REPORT, supra note 133, at 3.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 3-5.
140. Id. at 5.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 5-6.
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Chief Robertson's estimate that reworking sales as a result of
administrative appeals cost the agency between $100 and $150
million. 43 Appeals that result in reworked timber sales may actually
save the agency money, the report stated, "if they prevent subse-
quent litigation based on those rulings."'144 And finally, the report
observed that stays of timber sales during administrative appeals
do not appear to pose a problem, since most appeals are resolved
in a timely manner. 45
Although the OTA and CRS reports added important insights
about the effect of the appeals program, they did little to bring
the warring sides of this controversy any closer together. The reports
were often cited by conservationists arguing against the elimination
of timber sale appeals. Timber groups tended to pay them little
heed. The two sides remained staunchly camped in their opposing
positions. The possibility of reconciling their views appeared re-
mote.
On May 21, 1992, Georgia Senator Wyche Fowler, chair of
the Senate Agriculture forestry subcommittee, led an oversight
hearing on the appeals proposal. After listening to Forest Service
Chief Robertson testify about the problems caused by the appeals
program,' 46 Fowler accused Robertson of exaggerating the prob-
lems, and said that the proposal to eliminate appeals "will not
stand."147 Fowler continued:
This thing's not going to work .... You are not going to
solve the problem by saying you want less public participation.
To go in and say, 'Well, we'll listen to these people, but if
we disagree with them, tough. That's it. Book closed. You have
no appeal. We are the government, not you .... I am the god
of the forest.' . . . You're asking for more trouble than you
and I can imagine. 48
143. Id.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. Robertson said, among other things:
Our timber sale program is in chaos; it's a shambles. It'd be like trying to
put 100 design engineers on the assembly line as cars are trying to be made and
tell them we need new ideas on how to produce a better car while we're trying
to make a car.
Our people are canceling, they're backing up, they're throwing out timber
sales. You cannot believe the amount of shuffling that's going on with appeals,
lawsuits, all these other things.
Carol Bradley, Forest Chief Challenged on Plan to Curb Appeals, GANNET NEWS SERV.,
May 21, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
147. Id.
148. Id. On July 1, 1992, Senator Fowler introduced a bill that would require the
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Later, House Speaker Thomas Foley wrote a letter to Secretary
Madigan expressing his concern that the appeals proposal would
violate the legal guarantees of "full and open public participation
in the processes of the Forest Service" and "significantly weaken
any efforts by the administration or by the Congress to restore
public confidence in the agency's decisions.' ' 4 9 This provoked a
response from Senator Bob Packwood, who in a separate letter to
Secretary Madigan urged the agency to adopt the appeals proposal
"despite opposing pressure" from the House Speaker. 50
Finally, in the waning days of the 102d Congress, legislators
slapped together a compromise preserving project level appeals.
Inserted as section 322 of the 1993 Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies [including the Forest Service] Appropriations Act,'
the legislation addresses both aspects of the March 1992 proposed
rule: notice and comment requirements, and appeals of project-
level decisions, including timber sales. 52
The legislation adopts the proposed rule requirement that the
Forest Service provide notice and allow thirty days for comments
on project-level decisions.' The legislation, however, broadens the
requirement in two ways. First, in addition to publishing the notice
in a newspaper of general circulation, the agency must also mail
the notice to any individual who requests it or "who has partici-
pated in the decisionmaking process."'15 4 In order to effectuate this
broadening, the agency must interpret "participated in the deci-
sionmaking process" to include contributing to the LRMP that
guided the project decision. Also, the Forest Service should imple-
ment this section to allow people interested in knowing about all
project-level decisions in a particular forest to submit a general
request for notice. By contrast, requiring a project-specific inquiry
to receive notice would place the public in a catch-22 where a
person needs to know about a proposed decision in order to request
Forest Service to establish both pre-decisional notice and comment procedures and post-
decisional administrative appeal procedures for project-level decisions. See S. 2921, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). A similar companion bill was introduced the next day in the House.
See H.R. 5547, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
149. David Schaefer, Foley Acts to Save Timber-Cut Appeals, SEATTLE TIMES, June
24, 1992, at B5.
150. Northwest Timber III: Packwood Pushes to Eliminate Appeals, GREENWIRE, June
29, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File.
151. Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374, 1419 (1992). President Bush signed
the Act on Oct. 5, 1992.
152. Id.
153. Id. § 322(b).
154. Id. § 322(b)(1)(A).
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notice of it. Second, the legislation requires such notice for all
decisions, not just those documented in an EA or FONSI.'" This
is a less important distinction, however, because most decisions not
subject to a FONSI will go through the EIS scoping process. Unlike
the proposed rule, the legislation places no time limit on the Forest
Service to make a final decision after the comment period closes.
Although the legislation rejects the USDA proposal to eliminate
outright administrative appeals for project-level decisions, it does
restrict appeal opportunities. The legislation limits appeals to per-
sons who participated in the thirty-day public comment process. 5 6
This marks the first time that Forest Service administrative standing
has been linked to earlier participation in a public comment process.
The legislation does not provide for a waiver of this requirement
where the final decision raises issues not evident in the notice of
the proposed action. The legislation retains the current forty-five
day deadline for filing an appeal after a final decision.'
The appeals process mandated by Congress begins with an
opportunity for informal settlement. Someone from the Forest
Service will contact an appellant and offer to meet to dispose of
the appeal.'58 If the appeal cannot be settled informally, the Forest
Service conducts a formal review. Formal review requires an appeals
review officer, who is a line officer at least at the level of the
initial decisionmaker, to make a recommendation to the official
responsible for ruling on the appeal.15 9
The Forest Service has a deadline of thirty days after the
closing date for filing an appeal (with a fifteen day extension) to
formally review and rule on the appeal. 16° However, the Forest
Service suffers no penalty for missing this tight deadline. In fact,
the legislation provides an incentive for the agency to drag its feet
on appeal disposition. If the Forest Service fails to decide an appeal
in the forty-five days (thirty-day deadline plus extension of fifteen
days), then the appealed decision is deemed a final agency action. 6'
The automatic stay of decisions expires fifteen days later. 62 Thus,
a convenient way for the Forest Service to deal with a difficult
appeal will be to miss the deadline for disposition. Fifteen days
155. Id. § 322(b)(1).
156. Id. § 322(c).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 322(d)(1)(A).
159. Id. § 322(d)(2).
160. Id. § 322(d)(3).
161. Id. § 322(d)(4).
162. Id. § 322(e)(2).
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later, the agency may proceed with the project without having
responded to the appellant's allegations. Under the 1989 section
217 appeals rule, the Forest Service often missed its 100-day dead-
line to decide project-level appeals.1 63 Congress has required the
Forest Service to maintain a project level appeals process on paper
only. The actual effect may be no different from the March 1992
USDA proposal.
Lost in the cacophony surrounding appeals reform is the fact
that conservationists were almost as unhappy as timber groups with
the appeals system before the 1992 USDA proposal. Conservation-
ists generally argue that line officer review is biased against them,
appeal decisions are unresponsive to legal arguments, and the dead-
line notice of appeal does not allow enough time to marshal their
arguments adequately. Until their battle strategy shifted to an
attempt to save the existing rule, conservationists appeared to agree
with timber groups about at least one fact: there had to be a better
way to handle appeals.
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FOREST SERVICE DECISIONS
Appeals do not end with the exhaustion of the administrative
process. Many appellants, unhappy with the outcome of line officer
review, have taken their cases to court. The Forest Service maintains
that neither the NFMA nor any other law requires it to hear
administrative challenges to its resource management decisions. 6
Even though the NFMA does not explicitly provide for judicial
163. 36 C.F.R. § 217.8(e) (1992). The CRS Report found that the Forest Service took
an average of 3.4 months to resolve timber sale appeals. CRS REPORT, supra note 133, at
5.
164. But see Mark Squillace, Administrative Review of U.S. Forest Service Decisions,
in ABA SEC. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY, & ENVTL. L., NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC
LANDS DECISIONS: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5 (May 22, 1992).
Professor Squillace argues that section six of the APA requires all federal agencies, whether
or not they have formal appeals procedures, to respond to appeals made by interested
persons. The APA states:
So far as the orderly conduct of business permits, an interested person may
appear before an agency or its responsible employees for the presentation, ad-
justment, or determination of an issue, request, or controversy in a proceeding,
whether interlocutory, summary or otherwise, or in connection with an agency
function. With due regard for the convenience and necessity of the parties or
their representatives and within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to
conclude a matter presented to it.
5 U.S.C § 555(b) (1988). The Senate Committee Report on the APA explained this provision:
The section affords the parties in an agency proceeding, whether or not formal
or upon hearing, the right to prompt action upon their requests, immediate notice
of such action, and a statement of the actual grounds therefor.
S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 265-68 (1946).
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oversight of Forest Service decisions, federal law gives persons
harmed by administrative action the right to seek review in federal
district court. 65 The courts remain the ultimate guarantors of fair-
ness in public resource management.
Litigation challenging Forest Service decisions involves a wide
array of subjects and statutes that reflect the diverse resources
produced and constituencies served by the agency.'6 Nonetheless,
most cases involve alleged violations of the NFMA and NEPA.
These two statutes work in tandem to offer appellants the best
opportunity for judicial redress. The Forest Service strives to in-
tegrate the requirements of both laws. 67 The outcomes of judicial
appeals commonly hinge on some combination of three issues:
standing, supplementation of the administrative record, and stan-
dard of review.
A. Standing
Even though the federal judiciary has subject matter jurisdic-
tion to review Forest Service actions, a person cannot bring an
appeal to court without first establishing standing. Standing requires
that a plaintiff have a personal, direct stake in the case.'6 Standing
has become an increasingly difficult hurdle for environmentalists
challenging federal agency actions since the Reagan Administration
began litigating the issue vigorously. 69 In 1990 the U.S. Supreme
Court confirmed a trend in lower courts to require a more direct
165. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). See Sierra Club v. Marita, 769 F. Supp. 287, 289 n.6
(E.D. Wis. 1991) (discussing federal court jurisdiction to review a challenge to the Forest
Service's adoption of an LRMP).
166. Cases involve contracts, ski areas, wilderness, timber, endangered species, water,
grazing, mining, and oil/gas development. See Stephanie M. Parent, Comment, The Na-
tional Forest Management Act: Out of the Woods and Back to the Courts?, 22 ENVTL. L.
699, 712-28 (1992) (describing cases reviewing Forest Service decisions under the NFMA).
167. Michael J. Gippert & Vincent L. DeWitte, Forest Plan Implementation: Gateway
to Compliance with the NFMA, the NEPA and other Federal Environmental Laws, in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, 10 CRITIQUE OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN-
NING i (Sept. 3, 1990 revisions). For instance, both the NFMA and NEPA require public
participation in many Forest Service decisions. The agency uses notice, opportunities for
comment, and documentation of information to satisfy both laws.
168. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972) (standing is limited to plaintiffs
with "a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolu-
tion"). A trade organization or environmental group can have standing only if it can point
to individual members that have standing in their own right. Hunt v. Washington Apple
Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977) (establishing a three-part test for represen-
tational standing).
169. See Rochelle Stanfield, Out-Standing in Court, 20 NAT'L J. 388 (1988); Kirk
Victor, Standing Dispute, 21 NAT'L J. 710 (1989).
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connection between an interest in the use of public lands and the
challenged agency action. 70 Standing has both a constitutional and
a statutory component. 7'
The U.S. Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to de-
ciding cases and controversies. 72 This constitutional aspect of stand-
ing frequently is divided into three components: injury in fact,
causation, and redressability. 73 Injury in fact requires the plaintiff
to show actual or threatened personal injury. 74 Causation requires
that the injury be fairly traceable to the government action. 175
Finally, a plaintiff must show that the court can grant relief that
will redress the injury. 76
Statutory standing applies more directly to the specific legal
basis of the complaint. The NFMA, like NEPA, does not contain
a citizen suit provision. Therefore, most appellants who seek judicial
review rely on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for statu-
tory standing to challenge Forest Service decisions. 7 7 According to
the APA, "a person suffering legal wrong because of agency action,
or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof."' 78
The U.S. Supreme Court interprets this provision to impose
two statutory standing requirements on a plaintiff. '79 First, the
plaintiff must identify some specific agency action. For statutes
such as NFMA and NEPA, which do not authorize review, the
action must be a final agency action under the APA.' 80 Second,
the plaintiff must establish an injury that falls within the zone of
170. Lujan v. National Wildlife.Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). See Karin Sheldon, NWF
v. Lujan, Justice Scalia Restricts Environmental Standing to Constrain the Courts, 20
ENVTL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,557, 10,557 (1990) (describing the trend in lower federal
courts). The Supreme Court showed no sign of retreating from its posture on standing in
its latest pronouncement, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
171. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2144-46.
172. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § 2.
173. See e.g., Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. 546, 550 (W.D. Ark. 1991);
Sheldon, supra note 170, at 10,558.
174. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp. at 550 (quoting Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)).
175. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1517 (9th Cir. 1992).
176. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2140-42.
177. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). Plaintiffs basing their claims on the Endangered Species
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1988), or the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988), can
secure statutory standing under the citizen suit provisions contained in those laws. However,
they still must prove injury in fact. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2130.
178. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988).
179. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990).
180. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
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interests "sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose
violation forms the legal basis for his complaint.""'8'
Federal courts have not consistently applied the confusing and
overlapping elements of standing in cases involving review of Forest
Service decisions.182 Statutory and constitutional requirements blend
together, particularly in discussions of injury. The most difficult
standing cases involve challenges to LRMPs. Even though the Forest
Service permits administrative appeals, it argues that courts should
not review approvals of forest plans because plaintiffs do not have
standing. Although the trend in the small group of LRMPs sub-
jected to published judicial scrutiny is to grant standing,'83 recent
Supreme Court standing decisions 84 may create problems for ap-
pellants seeking judicial review.
In appeals of both the Idaho Panhandle and the Flathead
National Forest LRMPs, district courts in the Ninth Circuit initially
held that plaintiffs did not have standing.8 " Without analyzing the
issue according to the conventional categories described above, these
courts found that because the LRMPs do not commit the agency
to any future development, the plaintiffs' alleged injury was too
remote to support standing. 86 Any future development activities,
namely road-building and timber sales, would require site-specific
analysis under NEPA. 87 Plaintiffs would have to wait until the
181. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. at 883; see also Association of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
182. See supra notes 146-150 and accompanying text.
183. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992) (Idaho
Panhandle N.F.-standing discussed and granted); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 764 F. Supp.
546 (W.D. Ark. 1991) (Ouachita N.F.-standing discussed and granted); Sierra Club v.
Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990) (Bighorn N.F.-court addressed merits without
discussing standing); Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970 (D.
Colo. 1989) (Rio Grande N.F.-court addressed merits without discussing standing); Griffin
v. Yeutter, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,400 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (Cleveland N.F.-
court addressed merits without discussing standing). But see Resources Ltd. v. Robertson,
789 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Mont. 1991) (Flathead N.F.-standing discussed and denied).
184. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
185. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,666
(D. Mont. Aug. 8, 1990), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Idaho
Panhandle"); Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 789 F. Supp. 1529 (D. Mont. 1991) appeal
pending 92-35047 (notice of appeal filed Dec. 24, 1991) before the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ("Flathead").
186. Idaho Conservation League, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,667-68;
Resources Ltd., 789 F. Supp. at 1533-34.
187. The Idaho Conservation League district court erroneously noted that the Forest
Service "will again be required to prepare an EIS which is specific to the proposed
development." Idaho Conservation League, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,668.
The Forest Service frequently prepares only an environmental assessment for development
activities, such as timber sales, and tiers it to the EIS prepared for the LRMP.
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project-level tier of decisionmaking to secure standing to challenge
the agency in court.
These two LRMP decisions hinted at aspects of both the
statutory and constitutional requirements in their brief discussions
of standing. From the statutory perspective, because the LRMP
does not bind the Forest Service to conduct the activities allowed
in the plan, the LRMP may not be a final agency action for the
purposes of APA review of NEPA and NFMA compliance. The
constitutional problems arise because no injury-in-fact can occur if
an agency has not actually committed to do anything. If the LRMP
merely allows for the possibility of future development, as the
Forest Service has alleged,"' s then adoption of the plan does not
cause any harm until the Forest Service takes some further, review-
able implementation step.
On appeal, however, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed
the Idaho Panhandle district court's finding on standing and put
in question the Flathead court's decision as well.8 9 Although it
affirmed the Forest Service's victory on the merits, the circuit court
used a constitutional analysis to hold that the plaintiff environ-
mental groups did have standing to bring suit. First, the court
found that the plaintiffs identified injury-in-fact even though the
harm of the Forest Service's decision to permit logging in roadless
areas was only potential, or contingent, in the sense that the LRMP
did not itself authorize ground-disturbing activities. In discussing
the constitutional injury-in-fact standard, the court incorporated
the statutory zone of interest analysis in finding that Congress
contemplated an initial decision by the Forest Service not to protect
a roadless area in a plan as an important step that can injure a
citizen.' 90 The appeals court took the LRMP more seriously than
the Forest Service in finding that programmatic authorization is an
important enough process to cause injury-in-fact and warrant re-
view.
The court also rejected the agency's argument that, like the
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation plaintiffs, the appellants did
not sufficiently specify a geographic location that was the location
of the injury. In National Wildlife Federation, the Court held that
the plaintiffs' affidavits alleging use of areas in the vicinity of lands
to be opened to mining was too generalized to allow a court to
188. Id.
189. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
190. Id. at 1516.
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hear the case.' 9l The Idaho Panhandle appeals court found that the
naming of specific areas in the forest that plaintiffs visit and enjoy
is sufficient to show a personal stake.' 92 Although the Idaho Pan-
handle plaintiffs could not predict which particular roadless areas
would be developed, they did identify use of distinct areas that
were unambiguously covered by the LRMP.193
Second, the Idaho Panhandle appeals court found that the
plaintiffs met the causation and redressability prongs of the standing
analysis despite the fact that development may never take place in
the roadless areas zoned by the LRMP to permit logging.'9 The
alleged injury stemming from NEPA and NFMA violations is that
the Forest Service overlooked environmental consequences of, and
reasonable alternatives to, the LRMP selected. 195 This injury is
directly traceable to the adoption of the plan. Also, because third
parties could not develop roadless areas but for the LRMP, the
injury of potential physical development also is caused by the
challenged decision. Under either theory, plaintiffs' injury would
be remedied by reconsideration of the LRMP.'9
In Sierra Club v. Robertson'97 ("Ouachita"), an Arkansas
federal court reviewing the Ouachita National Forest LRMP fore-
shadowed the Ninth Circuit decision when it granted plaintiffs
standing. 98 First, the court found that, unlike the land withdrawal
review program challenged in National Wildlife Federation, the
LRMP was both a written document recognized by legislation and
a prescriptive plan that establishes methods of land management.
Therefore, it was a final agency action.' 99 Second, the court found
that the plaintiffs were aggrieved because their affidavits detailed
specific parts of the forest that might be managed in a way that
would interfere with the plaintiffs' uses. This satisfies the zone-of-
interest prong of the statutory standing test because the recreational
and aesthetic interests that would be harmed are specifically refer-
enced in NEPA and NFMA.200
191. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
192. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1515.
193. Id. at 1516.
194. Id. at 1519.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. 764 F. Supp. 546 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 553-54.
200. Id. at 552.
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The Ouachita court rejected the Forest Service's argument
against constitutional standing. The agency maintained that, as a
"programmatic statement of intent," the LRMP cannot cause the
plaintiffs any direct, traceable harm.20 The court found that the
alleged injury was not too speculative because the LRMP specifi-
cally set out areas and methods for logging.2°2 The court did not
wish to require a plaintiff who challenges these decisions to wait
and appeal each project as it comes up.203 With the Ninth Circuit
reversal of the Idaho Panhandle district court finding on standing,
the Flathead LRMP appeal remains the lone decision where plain-
tiffs are denied standing for review of a forest plan.
Although plaintiffs can prove final agency action and injury-
in-fact for specific project decisions more easily than for LRMPs,
standing even in those situations is not automatic. In at least two
cases involving project-level decisions, courts have denied standing
for challenges based on violations of NFMA's limitation on below-
cost timber sales. In both cases, the court found that plaintiffs had
not demonstrated injury-in-fact because they did not have a per-
sonal stake in the outcome of the case.2° The courts held that any
injuries resulting from the Forest Service's violation of statutory or
regulatory limitations on below-cost timber sales would affect all
taxpayers equally and not specifically disadvantage the plaintiffs.
Although the plaintiffs in these cases used land that might be
adversely affected by the logging and roading proposed by the
Forest Service, the courts found that these harms were not traceable
to monetary losses from governmental timber sales.
Current standing law narrows the range of forest management
issues courts can address. Consequently, appellants must carefully
draft complaints to allege specific injuries and relief. In some cases
though, such as conflicts related to below-cost timber sales and
possibly LRMPs, the administrative process will serve as the final
forum for fulfilling appeal goals. This raises the stakes for designing
an administrative appeal system that fulfills more objectives than
just channelling disputes into the judiciary. Reform of the admin-
istrative appeals process will not affect judicial standing unless
Congress amends the applicable statutes. Even then, the Article III
201. Id. at 550-51.
202. Id. at 551.
203. Id. at 554-55.
204. Churchwell v. Robertson, 748 F. Supp. 768 (D. Idaho 1990); Big Hole Ranchers
Ass'n v. United States Forest Serv., 686 F. Supp. 256 (D. Mont. 1988).
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constitutional restrictions may impede efforts to open up the courts
for appeals of Forest Service decisions.
B. Supplementation of the Administrative Record
Challenges to Forest Service decisions are usually resolved by
the courts on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. District
courts in these suits seldom take evidence. 20 1 What the court will
consider in ruling on these motions is critical in determining which
side will prevail. The Forest Service typically will seek to limit
review to the administrative record that it compiled, which presum-
ably supports its decision. The plaintiffs, whether they be industry
or environmental groups, will seek to supplement the record to
challenge agency assertions.
If the administrative record is incomplete, the correct remedy
is to remand it to the agency. 206 However, a plaintiff may present
evidence to supplement the record when: (1) matters were considered
by the agency in rendering its decision but were omitted from the
record; or (2) the agency so fails to explain its decision that its
record frustrates effective judicial review. 207
Courts are not consistent in applying this strict rule and are
more likely to accept evidence in a NEPA challenge than in other
APA review cases. 28 Citizens for Environmental Quality v. United
States29 articulated the strict rule and then went on to allow
admission of the affidavits introduced by the plaintiff to help the
court understand the complex issues involved in the use of computer
models in forest planning. 210 The court explained that the affidavits
"illuminate the information contained in the administrative rec-
ord," but did not explain why they fall within one of the exceptions
to the rule against supplementation. 211 The recent Ninth Circuit
decision rejecting a challenge to the Idaho Panhandle LRMP con-
sidered similar affidavits.212
205. Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1990). See 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) for U.S. District Court jurisdiction.
206. Citizens for Envtl. Quality v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 970, 982 (D. Colo.
1989).
207. Id. (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420
(1971); Friends of the Earth v. Hintz, 800 F.2d 822, 830 (9th Cir. 1986)).
208. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 4:09[1][b] (2d ed.
1992) and cases cited therein.
209. 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989).
210. Id. at 982-83.
211. Id. at 983.
212. Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1520 n.22 (9th Cir. 1992).
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In contrast, the court reviewing an LRMP for the Nicolet
National Forest refused to supplement the record with plaintiff's
expert testimony on conservation biology.2 13 The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that background scientific evidence should be
admitted because it would assist judicial review. Quoting a Seventh
Circuit opinion affirming a district court denial of a preliminary
injunction against a timber sale, the Nicolet court limited extra-
record testimony to those situations where there is "no record and
no feasible method of requiring the agency to compile one in time
to protect the objector's rights. ' 214 Similarly, an Arkansas federal
court denied plaintiffs' request for a hearing to produce evidence
to support their motion for a preliminary injunction against timber
sales in the Ouachita National Forest. 21 5 The court observed that it
was not as well equipped to "select, hear, digest, and weigh the
relevant evidence" as trained agency specialists. 21 6
This inconsistency among courts illustrates a problem that
administrative appeal reform should help to solve. Courts are
justifiably uncomfortable allowing clarifying affidavits to supple-
ment the record for fear of opening the floodgates to a highly
technical fact-finding procedure in a situation where the agency is
entitled to deference on questions within its expertise. Nonetheless,
courts are tempted to accept some testimony when they suspect
that highly complex scientific or computer models obfuscate biases
in the decisionmaking process. A reformed system of administrative
appeals can differentiate aspects of Forest Service decisions based
on social preferences from those based on natural science. A clear
distinction would clarify the record for courts, dampen their urge
to supplement, and simplify their review.
C. Standard of Review
A Forest Service decision usually receives deference from a
court resolving a challenge to the agency's action. Courts apply the
deferential APA review standard to ensure that Forest Service
findings and decisions are not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. ' 217 This min-
imal scrutiny highlights the difference between judicial review and
213. Sierra Club v. Marita, 769 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
214. Id. at 291 (quoting Cronin v. United States Dept. of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 444
(7th Cir. 1990)).
215. Sierra Club v. Robertson, 784 F. Supp. 593 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
216. Id. at 601.
217. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
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administrative review, which can provide more sophisticated over-
sight by applying a more substantive standard of review.
In one of the most frequently cited statements of administrative
law, the U.S. Supreme Court interprets the APA standard to require
a court to determine
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.
Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful,
the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 28
It is not surprising then that courts seldom remand a Forest
Service land management decision. More recently, the Supreme
Court stressed the special importance of the deferential standard
of review when the record is highly technical. 21 9 Courts tend to
view Forest Service litigation as highly technical and will defer to
the agency's decision as long as the record shows that the Forest
Service considered the significance of all the available informa-
tion. 20 In the NEPA context, this test requires that the agency take
a "hard look" at the information. 22'
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma,222 the Idaho Panhandle
case, is typical of the cases where a plaintiff could not overcome
the deference afforded the agency. In Idaho Conservation League,
environmentalists charged that the Forest Service neglected to take
the required "hard look" at alternatives to the adopted plan. The
plaintiffs were particularly concerned that the agency did not con-
sider meeting timber production goals while protecting all existing
roadless areas. 223 Like Citizens for Environmental Quality,224 the
dispute over alternatives centered on assumptions made by Forest
Service computer models that filtered out the alternatives which
plaintiffs wanted the agency to consider. Although the court indi-
218. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
219. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360 (1989) (deferring to
agency's expert determination that new information relating to water quality did not require
a supplemental environmental impact statement for a water development project). See also
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
220. See e.g. Churchwell v. Robertson, 748 F. Supp. 768 (D. Idaho 1990) (citing
Marsh and dismissing a challenge to timber sales where the Forest Service prepared a
number of analyses addressing the issues that concerned the plaintiff).
221. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971); Sierra Club v. Robertson, 784 F. Supp. 593, 604 (W.D.
Ark. 1991).
222. 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir. 1992).
223. Id. at 1512.
224. 731 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1989) (Rio Grande National Forest LRMP).
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cated that it had considered the plaintiff's affidavits challenging
the agency's computer model, the court explained that it is "not
in a position to prefer [the plaintiffs'] view of the [Forest Service's]
software over the [Forest Service's] explanation. ' 22 So long as the
Forest Service can offer a rational explanation for narrowing the
alternatives it considers, the courts will not entertain debates over
the relative merits of computer program design.
In Citizens for Environmental Quality, the first judicial opinion
reviewing an LRMP (for the Rio Grande National Forest), the
court invoked the usual standards that guide review: APA section
706226 and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park.22 However, the court
also observed that review of LRMPs is special because of "the
technical complexity of the issues involved, and the possibility that
years of costly research and planning may be undone in the event
of a remand to the agency." 22 Despite the court's caution, it
remanded to the agency parts of the LRMP decision that were not
in compliance with the NFMA and NEPA. 229
The court's detailed treatment of several technical issues in-
volved in forest planning demonstrated a willingness to conduct the
searching analysis demanded by Overton Park. For instance, the
court analyzed the Forest Service's interpretation of its own regu-
lation implementing the NFMA's mandate to prevent irreversible
damage to soil conditions.230 The regulation prohibits designation
of lands as suitable for timber production if technology is not
available to ensure that productive use of the land can occur without
irreversible damage to soils.21 While agreeing with the agency's
regulatory interpretation of the NFMA requirement, the court found
that the Forest Service failed to comply with the regulation in this
instance. The LRMP EIS simply stated that "there were no forested
areas which were technologically unsuitable for timber produc-
tion. ' 232 The court remanded the LRMP to the agency for more
specific identification of the technology which would be used to
conserve the soil. Still, for disputed issues where the plaintiffs
submitted affidavits challenging Forest Service planning assump-
tions, the court continued to defer to the agency, "particularly
225. Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1522.
226. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
227. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
228. 731 F. Supp. at 983.
229. See Parent, supra note 166, at 720-24 (discussing the Rio Grande opinion in detail).
230. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i) (1988).
231. 36 C.F.R. § 219.14(a)(2) (1992).
232. Citizens for Envtl. Quality, 731 F. Supp. at 985.
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when a statute charges an agency with heavy analytical responsi-
bilities but no indication as to how they should be performed." '233
In two less complex situations, courts have remanded Forest
Service decisions. In Sierra Club v. Cargill,234 the district court
found the Bighorn National Forest LRMP to violate NFMA's
requirement that timber be harvested only where it can be restocked
within five years.235 The Forest Service had based the LRMP on a
seven year restocking period for those areas where restocking within
five years was, in theory, technologically feasible. In Seattle Au-
dubon Society v. Evans,236 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld a district court injunction against timber sales in spotted
owl habitat until the Forest Service promulgated standards and
guidelines to ensure the bird's viability. 237 The Forest Service im-
plements the NFMA mandate to provide for biological diversity 238
partially through its regulation requiring that it "maintain viable
populations of existing native and desired non-native" vertebrates. 23 9
The appeals court held that the agency continues to be bound by
the diversity requirement and the visibility regulation even after an
animal is protected under the Endangered Species Act. After the
agency submitted a plan to protect the owl, the same district court
again issued an injunction because the Forest Service failed to
consider important new information that showed owl populations
to be more vulnerable than originally thought. 240
The Rio Grande, Bighorn, and spotted owl cases are important
to understand what decisions courts will consider "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law."'4 The cases suggest that courts remand Forest Service
decisions only where the agency acts in direct opposition to statutory
or regulatory language. Since much of the resource management
and planning language lacks the precision even to have an opposing
position, judicial review seldom vindicates appellants. Plaintiffs
challenging Forest Service decisions have had greatest success using
the narrowest, most explicit NFMA provisions. The broader sus-
tainability mandate of the NFMA and other laws lies outside
233. Id. at 989.
234. 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo. 1990).
235. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(ii) (1988).
236. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991), aff'g 771 F. Supp. 1081 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
237. Id. at 300-01.
238. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (1988).
239. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1992).
240. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Mosley, 798 F. Supp 1484 (W.D. Wash 1992).
241. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
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judicial review despite its importance to environmental plaintiffs.
Although courts will not always defer to the Forest Service, the
review they offer cannot replace the more searching inquiry that is
possible during an administrative appeal.
III. SUSTAINABILITY AND A BOARD OF FOREST APPEALS
Forest Service appeals require substantive as well as procedural
reforms. Thus far, the debate over forest appeals has focused almost
entirely on procedure. Appeals regulations typically establish care-
fully thought-out rules for standing, notice, argument, intervention,
and other procedural elements. Unfortunately, attention to the
substantive standard of review is disproportionally small. To neglect
the substantive side of the appeals equation is to skirt a key question
for an appeals process. Most appeals, at heart, are motivated by
the appellant's substantive disagreement with a Forest Service de-
cision. Appeals that do not thoughtfully evaluate decisions in light
of the agency's substantive management mandates do not address
the real grievances of appellants. Without substantive review, due
process becomes an empty promise.
This part of the article argues that the major statutes governing
Forest Service decisions, taken together, establish a "sustainability
principle." We believe this principle, though by no means quanti-
fiably precise, offers a valuable measure for reviewing the quality
of Forest Service decisions. After discussing the sources and im-
plications of the sustainability principle, we advocate a set of
procedural reforms designed to make administrative appeals a better
system for both appellants and the Forest Service.
A. The Substantive Standard of Review
The current administrative appeals system creates a very in-
formal system of supervisory review-one that lacks clear standards
of review and gives reviewing officers wide discretion in scrutinizing
(or failing to scrutinize) the actions of their subordinates. Under
the 1983 version -of the appeals rules, reviewing officers were to
"apply independent judgment and decide, based on the record,
whether the deciding officer made a correct decision.' '242 Though
"correctness" may appear to be a strict standard of review, it
certainly begs the question of what factors make a decision "cor-
rect." The 1989 appeals rule fails to provide any standard of review;
242. APPEALS HANDBOOK, supra note 44, § 2.94; 36 C.F.R. §211.18(r) (1992).
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the rule merely specifies that the disposition of the appeal be
consistent with applicable law, regulations, and orders. 243 Moreover,
it neither specifies the form to be used in making an appeal, nor
requires deciding officers to explain their reasons for affirming or
reversing a decision. 2" Given this lack of guidance, it is little wonder
that appellants complain about not knowing what sorts of claims
to appeal, and the Forest Service complains about being saddled
with overbroad appeals.
The apparent vacuum in which appeal decisions are made is
curious in light of the federal legislation that sets the foundation
of national forest management. This legislation defines management
goals and provides the basis for substantive administrative review.
Besides providing specific checks on Forest Service discretion, the
legislation reflects an evolution toward a management regime guided
by the principles of sustained yield, or sustainability. A coherent
substantive standard of review for administrative appeals must
derive from the principle of sustainability, which is currently applied
only piecemeal, at best.
Sustainability has recently achieved status as the most commonly
invoked buzzword in environmental policy. The 1987 World [Brundt-
land] Commission on Environment and Development defined devel-
opment as sustainable if it "meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs."245 Five years and a major international summit later, progress
in explicating sustainability has been slight. During the United Nations
Conference on the Environment and Development (the Rio Summit),
the United States pledged $150 million in additional foreign aid for
forest protection.3 The United States can make a more significant
contribution to international conservation by demonstrating sustain-
ability on its own public forest lands.
1. The Early Legislation and the Rise of the Pinchot
Ethos
The starting point for any analysis of the Forest Service's legal
authority, the Organic Act of 1897, 247 sets forth the purposes for
243. 36 C.F.R. § 217.16(c) (1992).
244. This lack of formality contrasts with the appeal procedures of the Interior Board
of Land Appeals. See infra Appendix and Tables.
245. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
8 (1987).
246. Michael Wines, Bush Trying to Counter Criticism, Offers Plan to Save Earth's
Forests, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1992, at Al.
247. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 34-36 (codified, as amended, at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 473-82, 551 (1988)),
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which forest reserves (renamed "national forests" in 1907) can be
set aside. 2" According to this act, forest reserves cannot be estab-
lished "except to improve and protect the forest within the bound-
aries, or for the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water
flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the use
and necessities of citizens of the United States .. . , 249 Thus, the
Organic Act identified three purposes for establishing national for-
ests: (1) improving and protecting the forest; (2) maintaining wa-
tersheds; and (3) furnishing a "continuous supply" of timber to the
nation. The Organic Act also established broad authority to protect
the forests reserves from "depredations," preserve the forests from
destruction, and regulate use and occupancy of the forest reserves. 210
While the Organic Act specified the reasons for establishing
forest reserves, it provided little guidance as to how the agency
248. An earlier statute, the Creative Act of 1891, gave the President the authority to
reserve by proclamation public lands "wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth,
whether or commercial value or not . . . as public reservations." Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch.
561, 26 Stat. 1095, 1103 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 471 (1988)), repealed by the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, § 704(a), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743, 2792
(codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988)). Section 24 of the Creative Act provided:
That the President of the United States may, from time to time, set apart and
reserve, in any State or Territory having public land bearing forests, in any part
of the public lands wholly or in part covered with timber or undergrowth, whether
of commercial value or not, as public reservations, and the President shall, by
public proclamation, declare the establishment of such reservations and the limits
thereof.
Within a month after enactment, President Harrison had established the Yellowstone Park
Forest Reserve. Within two years, he had established 14 other reserves totalling 13 million
acres. SAMUEL T. DANA & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY: ITS DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES 102 (2d ed. 1980).
249. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1988).
250. The Organic Act provides:
The Secretary of the Interior shall make provisions for the protection against
destruction by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests
... and he may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as
will insure the objects of such reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy
and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction ....
Ch. 2, 30 Stat. 35 (1905) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1988)).
Originally controlled by the General Land Office in the Department of Interior, the
forest reserves were transferred to the authority of the Department of Agriculture's Division
of Forestry (soon renamed the Forest Service), under the direction of Gifford Pinchot, in
1905. Transfer Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288, § 1, 33 Stat. 628 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
472 (1988)).
In a landmark 1911 ruling, the Supreme Court endorsed the agency's broad powers
"to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction." United
States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522 (1911). Since the Grimaud decision, lower courts
have consistently upheld the agency's authority to regulate and manage national forests
under the "occupancy and use" language of the Organic Act. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON
& H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND AND RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE NATIONAL FORESTS 52-
60 (1987) (discussing cases).
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should exercise its discretion once a reserve had been established.
The statute was an extremely broad delegation of power, inviting
the agency, in the Supreme Court's words, to "fill up the details"
with its own regulations.25 1 As Professor Wilkinson has written,
"[tjhe 1897 Act was a blank check, made out to the Forest Service,
to manage these lands as it saw best. ' 2 2 Soon the agency had
stepped into the statutory void, first in a famous letter in which
Gifford Pinchot spelled out the new agency's mission upon transfer
to the Department of Agriculture, 253 and later in the Forest Service's
early bible, the Use Book of 1907.24 Both the Pinchot Letter and
the Use Book made one point very clearly: the national forests were
to be managed principally for timber production-" for the benefit
of the home-builder first of all,' '255 and "chiefly for the production
of timber and wood. '256
Before the post-war boom in lumber demand, the nation's
timber supply came primarily from privately-held stocks, 257 and use
of the national forests for timber and other purposes remained at
low levels. Where conflicts over the use of forest resources occurred,
they could be resolved fairly easily by segregating uses. In this era,
the activities of the Forest Service went largely unchecked by public
or Congressional scrutiny, and the agency was viewed as an exemplar
of administrative excellence which needed little oversight.
During these first five decades, the Forest Service developed an
ethos of technical expertise, independence, and decentralization that
to this day typifies the agency's view of its mission and essential
character. This ethos, as much as the early legislation, guided the
agency's behavior. Above all, the Forest Service was an agency of
foresters, experts in the science of wise timber management, the
substance of their science passed down from the first professional
251. Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 517.
252. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Forest Service: A Call for a Return to First Principles,
5 PuB. LAND L. REV. 1, 7 (1984).
253. Although attributed to Pinchot, the letter was actually sent to Pinchot from the
Secretary of Agriculture on the day the forest reserves were transferred from the Department
of Interior to the Department of Agriculture. Pinchot later wrote "[t]hat letter, it goes
without saying, I had brought to the Secretary for his signature . PINCHOT, supra
note 5, at 260-62.
254. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, THE USE OF THE NATIONAL
FORESTS (1907) [hereinafter USE OF NATIONAL FORESTS].
255. Letter from James Wilson, Secretary of Agriculture, to Gifford Pinchot, quoted
in PINCHOT, supra note 5, at 261-62.
256. USE OF NATIONAL FORESTS, supra note 254, at 17.
257. Before the 1920s, for example, national forest lands were used more for livestock
grazing than for timber production. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, U.S. LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, NATIONAL FOREST RECEIPTS: SOURCES AND DISPOSITIONS 89-284 (1989).
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foresters of Europe, to their American protege, Gifford Pinchot, to
every forest ranger in the field. 258 Forestry in this tradition was a
practical agricultural science-"tree farming. "259 To find the true
personification of the Forest Service ethos, one looked not to
Washington, D.C. headquarters, but to the lone district ranger who
exemplified the traditional values of technical competence, inde-
pendent judgment, and commitment to the needs of the local forest,
its users, and nearby residents. 260 In his classic study, The Forest
Ranger, Herbert Kaufman observed:
When a Ranger takes over a new district, he is generally invited
promptly to join local, civic and community organizations-
partly because his position as manager of large properties auto-
matically makes him a person of some standing in most localities,
partly because the Forest Service is always "represented" in such
associations. It is with the Rangers that loggers, ranchers, pic-
nickers, and permittees of all kinds do business-both in nego-
tiating agreements with the Forest Service, and when the
agreements are supervised. The Rangers are therefore shown
considerable deference. The Rangers are cast in the role of law
enforcement officers when trespasses occur; to violators, they
often appear, and are treated, as figures of authority. Men
engaged for emergency fire fighting see them as fire bosses in
full charge of complicated and dangerous operations. They appear
before school and college groups, associations of young people
(4-H Clubs, Future Farmers of America, etc.), garden clubs,
hunting and fishing clubs, and similar groups in fulfillment of
their information and education responsibilities (especially for fire
prevention purposes). To many local residents, they are employers
who provide seasonal employment. In business circles, they ap-
pear as executives managing tens-even hundreds-of thousands
of acres of valuable land worth millions of dollars and doing
thousands of dollars worth of business every year. For most
people, in short, they stand for the Forest Service; indeed, they
personify the Forest Service. The role is thrust upon them. 261
258. Practically every Forest Service Chief, starting with Pinchot, has been a profes-
sional forester by training. See GLEN O. ROBINSON, THE FOREST SERVICE: A STUDY IN
PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT 28 (1975).
259. To use Pinchot's words:
Forestry is tree farming .... To grow trees as a crop is forestry. Trees may be
grown as a crop just as corn may be grown as a crop. The farmer gets crop
after crop of corn, oats, wheat, cotton, tobacco, and hay from his farm. The
forester gets crop after crop of logs, cordwood, shingles, poles, or railroad ties
from his forest, and even some return from regulated grazing.
PINCHOT, supra note 5, at 31.
260. See, e.g., Varick McCaskill character in IvAN DoIG, ENGLISH CREEK (1984).
261. HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR
194 (1960).
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2. The Conflicts of the Modern Era
The Pinchot ethos of wise, decentralized forest management
was the driving force behind the Forest Service's reputation for
excellence, a reputation which the agency enjoyed for at least the
first two generations of its existence. But the conditions that enabled
this ethos to flourish began to erode after World War II. Responding
to the rising demand for forest products in the post-war years,.
American timber and paper companies increasingly relied on the
national forests as their primary sources of wood. 2 2 The demand
for recreation on national forest lands also skyrocketed, increasing
by a factor of twenty-five between 1945 and the present. 263 Recent
years have witnessed a steady strengthening in American preservation
values, with greater sensitivity to the importance of ecosystem and
species diversity, and the preservation of the remaining uncut forests
and roadless areas.
In their combined effect, these developments have made it
impossible for the Forest Service to conduct business as it did under
Pinchot and his successors. The agency can no longer justify its
decisions on neutral scientific principles, but must unavoidably con-
front dilemmas that cannot be resolved without infuriating one or
several constituencies. Today the agency must make judgments that
rest, at least partly, on factors that are unscientific, politically
charged, and laden with social values.
The Forest Service has had a hard time coming to grips with
its new role. Despite two decades of turmoil over public lands
policy, and the fact that the agency's political independence has
eroded significantly, 264 the Forest Service still professes to follow the
262. Timber harvests from national forests averaged less than one billion board feet
(BBF) a year before World War 1I. In 1950, this number had risen to 3.5 BBF, and by
1966 it had reached 12.1 BBF. Annual timber harvests have largely stabilized, averaging
between nine and 13 BBF since the 1960s. OTA REPORT, supra note 133, at 36.
263. Id. at 37.
264. Although the Forest Service has been located in the Department of Agriculture
since 1905, until recently it exercised a remarkable degree of autonomy and independence,
with the Chief of the Forest Service (a nonpartisan appointee who typically remains in
office during a change of administration) having the last word on agency policy, rather
than the Secretary of Agriculture. This level of autonomy, unique in the federal government,
began to break down as successive Assistant Secretaries-M. Rupert Cutler under President
Carter and John Crowell under President Reagan-wielded increasing clout over Forest
Service policy. See Wilkinson, supra note 252, at 26. The recent proposal to scrap admin-
istrative appeals of timber sales-initiated as part of President Bush's 1992 deregulatory
campaign-may represent the ultimate politicization of the Forest Service. It is perhaps
more accurate to call it an "Administration proposal" than a "Forest Service" proposal.
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ethos of the Pinchot era. 26 It seeks public participation less to
involve citizens in decisions affecting public forests than simply to
gather data and points of view that will assist it in exercising its
expertise and independent judgment. The agency merely "listens"
before acting. The Forest Service views administrative appeals nar-
rowly as an "extension" of this form of public participation, not
as a forum for concerned parties to test the agency's decisions.
3. The Sustainability Principle in Modern Legislation
While the turn-of-the-century legislation granted broad discre-
tion to the Forest Service and fostered the agency's status as an
independent expert insulated from scrutiny, more recent statutes,
especially NFMA, NEPA and, to a lesser extent, the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA), 266 have imposed constraints
on the agency's authority. Although tensions within the Forest
Service's mandate remain, the evolution of statutory law still points
in the direction of sustainable resource management, one of the
founding innovations of the forest reserves. Reform of the admin-
istrative appeals system should reinvigorate the sustainability prin-
ciple and give it practical application. An analysis of the important
statutes provides some specific benchmarks of sustainability against
which appealed decisions can be measured.
a. MUSYA
By the mid-1950s, the Forest Service faced increasing pressure
from several quarters. Ranchers, timber companies, and wilderness
defenders all championed their causes before the agency and Con-
gress. The Park Service, which had grown by carving a number of
parks out of national forest lands, launched a highly visible program,
supported by President Eisenhower, to further expand its domain. 26 17
Confronted with these threats to its independence, the Forest Service
sought legislative endorsement of its authority under the Organic
Act, and in February 1960 the Department of Agriculture submitted
a multiple-use bill to Congress. 2" The bill generated little controversy
because it appeared to many observers as merely a formal recog-
265. See, e.g., Philip Shabecoff, The Battle for the National Forests, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1989, § 4, at 1, 24.
266. Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1988)).
267. For discussion of the pressures leading to the enactment of the MUSYA, see
DANA & FAIRFAX, supra note 248, at 179-201.
268. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 60.
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nition of the agency's existing power. Virtually unopposed, the bill
was quickly passed by Congress .269 Congress declared its policy to
manage the national forests for "outdoor recreation, range, timber,
watershed, and wildlife and fish purposes." 270 The MUSYA directs
the Forest Service to "administer the renewable surface resources
of the national forests for multiple use and sustained yield.' '271
This multiple use directive provides few concrete limits on the
agency's discretion. The act defines multiple use as
[tihe management of all the various renewable surface resources
of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination
that will best meet the needs of the American people .. .and
not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output.
27 2
While the multiple use directive has enabled the agency to defend
challenges to its regulatory authority in particular cases, 273 this aspect
of the act "breathe[s] discretion at every pore. ' 274 At most, the
multiple use requirement demands that the agency consider multiple
use values in making a decision. But as even a cursory examination
of the literature reveals, "multiple use" can be cited to justify
practically anything.
275
The definition of "sustained yield," however, more clearly
limits the agency's authority. The act defines sustained yield as "the
achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level annual
or regular periodic output of the various renewable resources of the
national forests without impairment of the productivity of the
land. ' 276 The Forest Service had long attempted to manage timber
269. Id. at 61-62.
270. 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1988).
271. Id. § 529.
272. Id. § 531(a).
273. See, e.g., McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1965) (upholding
agency's power under the MUSYA to prohibit use of motorized vehicles in "primitive area"
designated by agency).
274. Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1979) (quoting Stickland v.
Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)).
275. As the OTA Report explained,
"[Miultiple use" has multiple interpretations, meaning different things to different
people. To some, multiple use necessarily includes use of commodity resources
(timber, livestock, forage, minerals). Areas where such uses are proscribed, such
as recreation sites and wilderness areas, therefore are not considered multiple-use
areas. However, others have noted that such areas still yield water and are used
for recreation and by wildlife, while clearcuts effectively eliminate recreation use
of the harvest site, at least temporarily. It is unclear which uses or how many
uses are necessary for an area to be managed under multiple use.
OTA REPORT, supra note 133, at 45-46 (endnote omitted).
276. 16 U.S.C. § 531(b) (1988).
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for continuous production, and "sustained yield" of timber was
perhaps the cornerstone of Gifford Pinchot's approach to scientific
forestry.2 7 Yet in the MUSYA Congress recognized for the first
time that all renewable resources, not just timber, must be managed
on a sustainable basis. According to some commentators, the ap-
plication of the sustained yield concept to all resources was the most
important reason for the passage of the MUSYA. 271 However, the
agency has never seriously abided by this sustained yield constraint
and courts have not enforced it without supporting authority from
other statutes. 279
b. NEPA
As interpreted by two decades of court decisions, NEPA's chief
contribution has been procedural. 280 Nonetheless, Congress did im-
pose substantive responsibilities particularly relevant to national for-
est management.
Subsection 101(a) of NEPA announces a congressional decla-
ration "that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government
... to use all practicable means and measures ... [to] fulfill the
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans. "21 To implement this principle, subsec-
tion 101(b) places an ongoing responsibility on all federal agencies
to "improve and coordinate" their "plans, functions, programs,
and resources" so that the nation can
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
the environment for succeeding generations;
277. See Robert E. Wolf, National Forest Timber Sales and the Legacy of Gifford
Pinchot: Managing a Forest and Making it Pay, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 1037 (1989).
278. See OTA REPORT, supra note 136, at 47; Edward C. Crafts, The Saga of a Law:
Part I, Am. FORESTS, June 1970, at 12.
279. See 2 GEORGE C. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 160212] (1990 &
Supp. #4, June 1992) (observing that no court has remanded a resource management
decision solely because of MUSYA limitations). Coggins notes, however, that recent court
opinions show a trend toward deeper analysis of multiple use, sustained yield requirements
in reviewing agency actions. Id. (citing Headwaters, Inc. v. Bureau of Land Management,
684 F. Supp. 1053 (D. Or. 1988) (challenge to BLM logging decision), vacated as moot,
893 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1989); National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Forest Serv., 592
F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984) (Mapleton litigation challenging logging), appeal dismissed as
moot, 801 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1987)).
280. For discussion, see Nicholas C. Yost, NEPA's Promise-Partially Fulfilled, 20
ENVTL. L. 533 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court's minimization of substantive review
contradicts the drafter's intent, the statute's language, and the Council of Environmental
Quality's implementing regulations).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1988).
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(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation ....
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an envi-
ronment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach
the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.282
Subsection 102(1) makes it clear that these directives are not merely
hortatory statements of policy - they must be implemented by
federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible. '283
The Constitution gives Congress responsibility for public land
management in the Property Clause.214 The Forest Service, therefore,
must manage its lands according to the principles set by Congress.
The substantive aspects of NEPA must guide agency decisionmaking
regardless of what the courts may or may not be capable of
enforcing. Statutes, in addition to court decisions, define an agency's
responsibilities. Appeals standards should reflect NEPA's goals.
c. NFMA
The initial spark behind NFMA was a 1975 Court of Appeals
decision upholding an injunction against clearcutting on the Mon-
ongahela National Forest based on the timber sale provisions of the
Organic Act of 1897.285 Rather than simply remove the troublesome
language of the Organic Act, as some bills had proposed, Congress
took the opportunity to make wholesale changes in the Forest
Service's land management and planning authority. The resulting
law imposed new, forest-specific planning requirements, 286 new stan-
282. Id. § 4331(b)(1), (3), (4), (6).
283. Id. § 4332(1). As NEPA's chief sponsor in the Senate explained,
A statement of environmental policy is more than a statement of what we believe
as a people and as a Nation. It establishes priorities and gives expression to our
national goals and aspirations. It provides a statutory foundation to which
administrators may refer ... for guidance in making decisions which find envi-
ronmental values in conflict with other values.
115 CoNo. REc. 40,416 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
284. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 3.
285. West Va. Div. of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945
(4th Cir. 1975). The Organic Act on its face permitted harvesting only of "dead, matured,
or large growth of trees" that had been "marked and designated" before sale. Id. at 947.
286. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988).
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dards for public participation in agency decisionmaking, 217 and new
guidelines for forest management. 288
NFMA codified the agency's non-declining even flow (NDEF)
policy of timber management to ensure sustained yield. 2 9 Voluntarily
adopted by the Forest Service in the early 1970s, the NDEF policy
limits annual timber harvests to "a quantity equal to or less than
a quantity which can be removed in ... perpetuity on a sustained-
yield basis.' '290 The statute limits the quantity of timber available
to harvesting to the NDEF level unless the agency permits a depar-
ture under certain circumstances defined in the act. 291
The NFMA also requires the Forest Service to adopt regulations
advancing a number of specific management goals. The agency must
protect the diversity of plant and animal communities and preserve
the diversity of tree species. 292 It must provide research and evalu-
ation of management systems to insure that they "will not produce
substantial and permanent impairment of the productivity of the
land. "293 The agency must specify that increases in timber harvest
levels based on intensified management practices, such as tree thin-
ning and reforestation, are permissible only if such practices can be
implemented in accordance with the MUSYA. If they cannot, then
increased harvest levels are reduced at the end of each planning
period if the practices cannot be implemented or if funds supporting
these activities are not received. 294 The agency can authorize timber
harvesting only on lands where "soil, slope, or other watershed
conditions will not be irreversibly damaged," and where "there is
assurance that such lands can be adequately restocked within five
years after harvest. ' 295 The agency must protect "streams, stream-
banks, shorelines, lakes, wetlands, and other bodies of water from
detrimental changes" due to timber harvesting, such as changes in
water temperature, blockages of water course, and sedimentation. 296
287. Id. § 1604(d).
288. Id., § 1604, 1611.
289. See id. § 1611(a).
290. Id.
291. The agency may depart from the rigors of NDEF when the departure is "consistent
with the multiple-use management objectives" of the forest plan, and made with public
participation requirements of § 1604(d). Id. In addition, the agency may depart from NDEF
limitations to allow "harvesting of timber stands which are substantially damaged by fire,
windthrow, or other catastrophe, or which are in imminent danger from insect or disease
attack." Id. § 1611(b).
292. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
293. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(C).
294. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(D).
295. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i)-(ii).
296. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iii).
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It must insure that the timber harvesting method chosen "is not
selected primarily because it will give the greatest dollar return or
the greatest unit output of timber.''29 The agency may allow clear-
cutting only where it is determined to be the "optimum method"
of meeting the requirements of the applicable forest plan, and where
an interdisciplinary review has been completed and the potential
environmental, biological, aesthetic, engineering, and economic im-
pacts of each sale have been assessed. 29s And it must establish
"maximum size limits for areas to be cut in one harvest operation ' '299
based on "geographical areas, forest types, or other suitable clas-
sifications.' '3 These parameters of sustainability limit Forest Service
discretion and are far more specific than those imposed by other
laws affecting the agency.
297. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(iv).
298. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(i)-(ii).
299. Id. § 1604(g)(3)(F)(iv).
300. Id. In implementing these provisions of NFMA, the Forest Service regulations
identify 14 principles to guide regional and forest planning:
(1) Establishment of goals and objectives for multiple-use and sustained-
yield management of renewable resources without impairment of the productivity
of the land;
(2) Consideration of the relative values of all renewable resources, including
the relationship of nonrenewable resources, such as minerals, to renewable re-
sources;
(3) Recognition that the National Forests are ecosystems and their manage-
ment for goods and services requires an awareness and consideration of the
interrelationships among plants, animals, soil, water, air, and other environmental
factors within such ecosystems;
(4) Protection and, where appropriate, improvement of the quality of re-
newable resources;
(5) Preservation of important historical, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage;
(6) Protection and preservation of the inherent right of freedom of Amer-
ican Indians to believe, express, and exercise their traditional religions;
(7) Provision for the safe use and enjoyment of the forest resources by the
public;
(8) Protection, through ecologically compatible means, of all forest and
rangeland resources from depredations by forest and rangeland pests;
(9) Coordination with the land and resource planning efforts of other
Federal agencies, State and local governments, and Indian tribes;
(10) Use of a systematic, interdisciplinary approach to ensure coordination
and integration of planning activities for multiple-use management;
(11) Early and frequent public participation;
(12) Establishment of quantitative and qualitative standards and guidelines
for land and resource planning and management;
(13) Management of National Forest System lands in a manner that is
sensitive to economic efficiency; and
(14) Responsiveness to changing conditions of land and other resources and
to changing social and economic demands of the American people.
36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (1991).
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d. Other Laws
Forest Service discretion is limited by other environmental laws
that bolster the sustainability mandate. For instance, the Clean
Water Act seeks "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' '301 In conducting its
planning and management, the Forest Service must comply with
standard setting and permitting programs.302 In particular, the agency
must meet state nonpoint source protection practices, maintain state
water quality standards, and secure permits for dredge or fill activ-
ities .303 Another important environmental law is the Endangered
Species Act, which is designed to promote the recovery of ecosystems
on which threatened and endangered species depend. 3°4 The Forest
Service must contribute to this mandate under the Act's section
7(a)(1) duty to conserve. 305 Inaddition, the agency must avoid both
harming listed species and jeopardizing their continued existence.? 6
The Wilderness Act and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act also set stan-
dards that seek to maintain long-term environmental quality. All
these authorities should be incorporated in the sustainability prin-
ciple, along with the specific management limitations of NFMA.
4. Application of the Sustainability Principle
In combination, the MUSYA, NEPA, NFMA, and other laws
establish a foundation for what can be called a "sustainability
principle" for Forest Service decisionmaking. This sustainability
principle prohibits the agency from approving actions on national
forest lands that impair the long-term integrity of the resource base.
It applies to timber, as well as all other renewable and biological
resources managed by the Forest Service.
The Forest Service currently endeavors to achieve compliance
with the specific requirements imposed by federal legislation. But it
301. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
302. Id. § 1323.
303. See H. Michael Anderson, Water Quality Planning for the National Forests, 17
ENVTL. L. 591 (1986-87); Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 18, at 217-22.
304. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1988).
305. Id. § 1536(a)(1).
306. Id. §§ 1538, 1536(a)(2). Harm to a species includes "significant habitat modifi-
cation or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing
essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." Palila v. Hawaii
Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981); 852 F.2d 1106, 1107
n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1991)). The Forest Service has run afoul of
its duty not to harm endangered red-cockaded woodpeckers by allowing habitat modification
through timber management. Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1991).
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has not developed the overarching mandate to maintain resource
sustainability nearly as much as it has the technical requirements of
the law. To some extent, this is understandable because courts create
stronger incentives to comply with the more easily enforceable,
technical mandates. However, the Forest Service itself ought to be
able to incorporate the concept of sustainability into all of its
management practices. An appeals process that evaluates specific
cases based on this broader sustainability principle will give form
to the currently skeletal theory.
Current trends in judicial review will not soon lead to enforce-
ment of the broader implications of the sustainability principle.
Sustainability is a choice for the Forest Service to make: as an
innovation both to improve its stewardship of public resources and
to comply more closely with the management regime created by
federal statutes.
A great impediment to applying current federal law to National
Forest System management is the conflicting mandates within sta-
tutes (such as the multiple uses the Forest Service must support)
and between statutes (such as timber targets in appropriations bills
and environmental laws). The sustainability principle itself embodies
these inherent tensions in federal forest management: how to serve
some users without unfairly narrowing options for other (possibly
future) users. No amount of rulemaking, linear programming, or
public participation will make the resource management conflicts go
away. Nevertheless, explicit use of sustainability as a principle of
review will channel controversy over specific projects and plans into
a common language. Over time, the resolution of appeals in this
language will provide precedents that speak directly to management
concerns and that can be used practically to shape future decisions.
The Forest Service certainly has the discretion to adopt policies
for resource management. It should continue to do this through
rulemaking. Failure to map the contours of sustainability in regu-
lation, however, does not diminish the importance of the principle.
Appellate review should examine the application of regulations and
statutory provisions to particular situations. Like policymaking
through rules, a body of precedent growing out of the appeals
system we propose will guide future management decisions. Unlike
a rule-based approach, appeals decisions are limited to the particular
dispute at hand and allow for more specific, geographically-based
explanations of sustainability. We in the natural resources field have
been frustrated by attempts to define prescriptive rules for sustain-
ability. It is time for a new approach, an applied exegesis of
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management, that deepens the sustainability principle through case
examples .3 0
At the threshold of a new century, we find ourselves with a
more sophisticated (though still incomplete) understanding of the
biological integrity that must be maintained if yields of goods from
public lands are to be sustained. In 1897, public land management
reflected the era's understanding of nature with a regime that
conserved timber and watersheds. In the 1930s and 1940s, the same
principles of "multiple use, sustained yield" met emerging concerns
for preserving undeveloped attributes of "primitiveness" on the
public lands. The 1960 statute formally established outdoor recre-
ation, fish, and wildlife as forest resource management concerns.
Now is the perfect opportunity for the Forest Service to revise its
application of "multiple use, sustained yield" management so that
it again reflects current social and scientific concerns such as global
warming and biological diversity. °0 A Forest Service appeals system
that provides for systematic application of the sustainability principle
in reviewing development and planning decisions will enable the
agency to meet its Congressional mandate through practical appli-
cation of principles to particular cases.
B. Procedural Elements of a New Appeals System: A Forest
Appeals Board
A new model for Forest Service appeals needs to be concerned
with process as well as substance. Procedural rules govern how
principles will be applied in particular instances and often determine
outcomes. This section describes the procedural elements of our new
appeals model, which calls for the creation of an independent forest
appeals board. Table 1 (following the Appendix) summarizes these
307. Professor David Ehrenfeld makes an analogous argument with respect to ecosys-
tem management, which he calls the conservation paradox: "Active management needs
rules; rules are based on generalities, simplifications, and assumptions; and generality is
often the enemy of specificity, which is the same as diversity." David Ehrenfeld, The
Management of Diversity: A Conservation Paradox, in ECOLOGY, EcoNolacs, ETmcs: THE
BROKEN CIRCLE 26, 31 (F. Herbert Bormann & Stephen R. Kellert eds., 1991). Ecosystem
operation is, like sustainable development, incomprehensibly complex due to a myriad of
interdependent components. Ehrenfeld recommends "loose coupling" of management de-
cisions rather than formal, central rules. Id. at 38. Although an extreme application would
be no oversight of forest supervisor decisions, an appellate board resolves the tension
between ensuring that decisions are consistent with sustainable objectives and allowing local
conditions to guide application.
308. The NFMA planning regulations provide for "[r]esponsiveness to changing con-
ditions of land and other resources and to changing social and economic demands of the
American people." 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b)(14) (1991).
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procedural elements and compares them with other administrative
appeal systems. After this mostly descriptive section, we will analyze
the strengths and weaknesses of the new model.
1. Coverage
The new appeals system would be available to holders of written
instruments authorizing use and occupancy of national forest lands
as well as to members of the general public, and would cover
decisions at both the plan and project levels. Hence the coverage
of the new appeals system would be identical to that of the 1983
rules (Part 211), and would apply to disputes currently resolved
under the separate procedures of Parts 217 (as modified by the 1993
Appropriations Act appeals provision) and 251.1 09 Likewise, exclu-
sions from the new appeals system would be identical to those under
the 1983 rules, such as decisions appealable to the Agricultural
Board of Contract Appeals. 310
The decision to bifurcate the appeals system in 1989 was based
on the agency's view that disputes involving written instruments
were "grievances" and were "adjudicatory" in nature, thus de-
manding a certain quantum of due process under the APA, while
disputes involving decisions contested by members of the public
were merely a continuation of the "public participation" process,
demanding nothing from the APA.3 1  This reasoning ignores the
fact that when ordinary forest users bring appeals before the Forest
309. Id. §§ 217, 251.
310. See id. § 211.18(b).
311. The supplementary information accompanying the proposed change in the appeals
rule explicates this view. 53 Fed. Reg. 17,315-16 (1988). The conclusions of the Appeals
Regulation Review Team served as a basis for that supplementary information:
The concept is simple: appeals based on legal rights conveyed by a written
instrument to a party would be handled one way, and disputes involving agency
discretion in another. Both tracks would be contained in one rule, for example
Part A and Part B. On the "A" track, the party must show legal hurt. The
"B" track is for parties who request review of other kinds of decisions about
which they disagree, but which do not involve a legal instrument to which they
are a party. ...
A two-track system as described recognizes "due process" distinctions that
must be made between appellants who hold legal instruments and others who do
not. Under principles enumerated in the Administrative Procedures Act, "due
process" requirements are higher where rights are conveyed by a legal instrument
are involved. Thus, requirements in Track A & B concerning ex parte commu-
nication and contents of the record would be quite different.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, APPEALs REVIEW BRIEFING PAPER 20-
21 (Sept. 1987).
The agency's response to criticism of the two-track system rested on similar foundations.
See 54 Fed. Reg. 3343 (1989) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 217).
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Service they present grievances with as much foundation in law as
claims asserted by legal instrument holders. They are not seeking
to continue a dialogue with the Forest Service, but to claim that
their rights as forest users, established by federal statutes, have been
infringed by the agency. Their grievance with the agency is concrete
and based on legal standards, though sometimes less individualized
than that of aggrieved instrument holders.
There are also good reasons for allowing appeals of both plan-
and project-level decisions. In the course of drafting the first round
of forest plans and defending those plans in administrative appeals,
the Forest Service came to realize that the plans and the imple-
menting actions that followed them were better understood as two
phases of a single 'process than as two independent, detached, and
fundamentally different activities. Plans establish the parameters
under which project-level decisions take place. Individual projects
reveal the adequacy of each plan, which then may need to be revised
to account for the information revealed through projects. These
"tiers" of decisionmaking are mutually reinforcing; one informs the
other. As noted by Michael Gippert and Vincent DeWitte, attorneys
in the Department of Agriculture's Office of General Counsel, "[t]he
value of the multilevel approach is that it allows for flexible man-
agement that responds to new information and circumstances.' '312
Moreover, many of the most critical decisions affecting forest
lands take place at the project level rather than at the plan level.
Perhaps the clearest message in the forest plan appeals decided thus
far is that plans are framework documents only. They establish the
goals and objectives for forest managers, identify lands suitable for
timber production, establish a ceiling on how much timber can be
offered for sale during the plan's 10-year duration, provide moni-
toring and evaluation requirements, and recommend wilderness des-
ignation and wild and scenic river status .3 a They do not, however,
represent a "final and irretrievable commitment of resources," in
terms of NEPA. For this reason, many questions cannot be answered
by forest plans, and appeals involving these issues must await the
site-specific phase of the decisionmaking process. The Acting Assis-
tant Secretary made this point quite plainly in an appeal decision
on the Beaverhead National Forest plan:
I must stress the need to remember the purposes of an LRMP,
which does not, unless specifically indicated, make site-specific
312. Gippert & DeWitte, supra note 167, at 2.
313. Loose, supra note 7, at 2, 3.
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decisions. Under the staged decisionmaking procedure used by
the Forest Service, mandatory review of each stage (LRMP and
project) prevents the telescoping of any and every projected
environmental concern, such as those concerning sensitive species,
into one overwhelming obstacle which must be addressed at the
LRMP stage. Attempts to read site-specific decisions or direction
into an LRMP does not specify how each project is to comply
with these requirements, which is sensible given the variety of
site-specific conditions. For these reasons all parties must be
careful to view and use the LRMP for what it is: programmatic
direction for management of the various resources of a Forest. 14
Because plans and projects are interlocking pieces of a single process,
and because the project phase presents the opportunity to contest
specific claims concerning the effects of agency action, there is little
reason for the agency to limit appeals to plans only.
2. Pre-Decision Public Participation
An important consideration of the appeals process is the form
and extent of public participation that precedes the decisions that
can be appealed. NFMA requires public notice and comment as
part of the development of forest plans.3"5 Many forest units provide
similar pre-decisional notice and comment for project-level decisions
as well. The 1992 USDA proposal and the 1993 Appropriations Act
impose notice and comment procedures for pre-decisional review.31 6
Pre-decisional public involvement is important for several rea-
sons. It provides the agency with information and viewpoints at a
stage when a decision can be modified. It introduces members of
the public to the full range of concerns implicated in a decision
early in the process. It forces the public to voice its opinions at a
time when those opinions can be most effective. 1 7 It also enables
the agency to clarify misunderstandings and resolve disputes more
314. Decision in Appeals Nos. 1575 & 1596, Beaverhead National Forest Plan (Aug.
17, 1989).
315. 16 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1988) provides:
In exercising his authorities under this subchapter and other laws applicable
to the Forest Service, the Secretary, by regulation, shall establish procedures,
including public hearings where appropriate, to give the Federal, State, and local
governments and the public adequate notice and an opportunity to comment
upon the formulation of standards, criteria, and guidelines applicable to Forest
Service programs.
316. See 57 Fed. Reg. 10.444, 10.447 (1989) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 217.23,
.25) (proposed Mar. 26, 1989); Pub. L. No. 102-381 § 322(b), 106 Stat. 1374 (1992).
317. As discussed infra part 4, participation in the pre-decisional phase of a decision
would be a jurisdictional prerequisite to later appeals under the system recommended in
this article.
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easily than it can at subsequent stages of the decisionmaking
process.31
The 1992 USDA proposal did not provide an adequate model
for pre-decisional public participation. It would have notified the
public of upcoming projects in local newspapers, which would be
listed periodically in the Federal Register. However, the potentially
interested public extends well beyond the circulation of these local
newspapers. It is unreasonable to expect a person living in Virginia,
for example, to keep abreast of newspapers in the Pacific Northwest
in order to ascertain the pendency of individual forest sales or
mineral leases. If this person requests notification of pending sales,
it is not unduly burdensome to require the agency to provide notice
by mail. Many forest units already follow such a procedure. 19 The
1993 Appropriations legislation appears to account for this defi-
ciency in the USDA proposal by requiring the Forest Service to
mail notice "to any person who has requested it in writing and to
persons who are known to have participated in the decisionmaking
process."32°
Regardless, the thirty-day comment period provided by both
the USDA proposal and the Appropriations Act may not be suffi-
cient for complex projects. This period should be extended, upon
request, to forty-five days for projects. This investment of time is
well worth the cost it entails because better-informed participants
will be more likely to submit more carefully honed comments (and
hence more streamlined appeals), thus simplifying the agency's job
upon appeal.
3. Independent Board of Forest Appeals
Forest officers should be relieved of the burden of processing
appeals. Appeals can instead be decided by an independent board
318. Negotiations and alternative dispute resolution should take place during the pre-
decisional phase of the process, not at the appeal stage as the existing regulations encourage.
For discussion of dispute resolution techniques in this context, see JULIA M. WONDOLLECK,
PUBLIC LANDS CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION: MANAGING NATIONAL FOREST DISPUTES (1988);
William Shands, et al., National Forest Planning: Searching for a Common Vision, in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, 2 CRITIQUE OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLAN-
NING (1990).
The time for dispute resolution is before a decision is finally made. Appeals of that
decision should be designed to adjudicate specific objections and complaints, not to reopen
the decision to negotiation.
319. 57 Fed. Reg. 10,447 (1992).
320. Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322(b)(l)(A), 106 stat. 1374 (1992). See supra note 151
and accompanying text for a discussion of the construction of this provision.
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of appeals within the Department of Agriculture. Proposals of this
sort have been raised from time to time over the past several years.121
The agency has rejected this idea primarily because, in its view,
such an arrangement would add a layer of legal formality to the
appeals process which would undermine the agency's desire to main-
tain a flexible, informal system.3 22
But the advantages of establishing an external appeals board
far outweigh its disadvantages. Line officers are torn between the
competing, and sometimes conflicting, roles of on-the-ground man-
agement and appellate decisionmaking. A common criticism of the
existing appeals system is that it siphons time and resources away
from management activities. An independent appeals board would
enable line officers to concentrate on their primary duties-to get
out of court and get back into the forests. Consolidating responsi-
bility for appeals in a single body would also promote consistency
in appellate decisionmaking, creating a more accessible and useful
"common law" of Forest Service appeals. Moreover, an independent
appeals board would also be better insulated from the agency's
internal political pressures, fostering both the appearance and reality
of due process and impartiality, a rare and precious commodity in
the modern Forest Service.
The composition of the appeals board is critical. The combi-
nation of scientific, legal, and public policy issues embedded in
public forest disputes suggests that the board should include experts
in biological and ecological sciences in addition to foresters and
attorneys. A board dominated by one profession would tend to
restrict its view of the matters before it to the areas of its own
expertise, undermining its ability to decide hard cases with sophis-
tication and foresight. An interdisciplinary board, by contrast, would
more fully understand the implications of the issues and arguments
before it. At best, the board's decisions would reflect the cross-
fertilization of knowledge and experience that comes with interdis-
ciplinary consideration. At least, an interdisciplinary board would
prevent a single professional viewpoint from monopolizing the pro-
ceedings. A wide range of expertise is all the more necessary given
the evolving character of the board's efforts. The sustainability
principle is not a simple or self-defining concept. Its meaning and
application would necessarily evolve over time, as the board consid-
321. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 133, at 98; CRS REPORT, supra note 133, at
25-29.
322. See APPEALS REVIEW BRIEFING PAPER, supra note 311, at 16-17 (discussing and
rejecting external appeals board).
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ers a growing variety of situations, arguments, and evidence. 323
To assure adequate representation of the relevant disciplines on
the board, members could be selected to fill three general categories
of expertise: technical, scientific, and legal. Technical experts would
have knowledge of the specific decisionmaking techniques and com-
puter models employed by the agency. Scientific experts would have
knowledge of matters such as conservation biology, forestry, and
hydrology. And legal experts would have knowledge of hearing
procedures, statutory interpretation, and legal argumentation.
Representation of each of these categories of experts could be
made equal, both on the board as a whole and in the panels formed
for particular cases. The board as a whole could consist of equal
numbers of technical, scientific, and legal experts (for instance, five
of each for an entire board of fifteen members). Panels of three
board members, one from each category, could be chosen at random
for each appeal. The panel member from the legal category could
preside over any fact-finding hearings or oral presentations, but
each member of the panel would have an equal vote in the ultimate
decision. To deal with matters of administration and case manage-
ment, one member of the board could be selected chair.
Appointment procedures would safeguard the independence of
the board. The Secretary of Agriculture or the Chief of the Forest
Service could appoint forest appeal board members who would be
protected senior executive service civil servants, like Interior Board
of Land Appeals (IBLA) judges.324 To ensure the appointment of
qualified board members, the selection process could include a
nominating procedure or screening by a nonpartisan advisory com-
mittee, which could submit a list from which the Secretary or Chief
would choose. The board members should be selected for stated
terms, such as five years. Once the board is established, its members
323. There is precedent for an administrative decisionmaking board composed of
scientific experts. The Food and Drug Administration has used a "Public Board of Inquiry"
(PBOI) to obtain competent scientific review of certain regulatory actions. The PBOI
consists of a panel of three scientists selected by the Commissioner, two of whom are
chosen from recommendations of the parties. According to the Administrative Conference
of the United States, the PBOI "combines the elements of a 'scientific hearing' with the
more typical 'adversarial hearing' approach to the evaluation of scientific evidence. ...
The Board obtains scientific 'testimony' within an informal quasi-adjudicative hearing
framework, in which the advocacy role of lawyers is minimized in favor of a 'scientific
forum' approach .... Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 1 C.F.R. § 310.11 (1992) (statement on hearing procedures for the resolution of
scientific issues). The Administrative Conference recommends continued experimentation
with such alternative types of hearing procedures. Id.
324. The Appendix and Table 2 describe the IBLA and summarize its procedural rules.
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could serve staggered terms, with a new trio of members (one from
each category of experts) replacing the senior-most trio each year.
This would help preserve the institutional memory of the board with
minimal political interference.
The board would review only Forest Service decisions. The
creation of a "superboard" for both Forest Service and BLM
decisions may be desirable at some point in the future, but limiting
the jurisdiction of the board to Forest Service decisions is presently
the best course of action. The Forest Service and the BLM are
subject to overlapping, but not identical, statutory directives. A
superboard for both agencies would have to face the complexities
inherent in applying two sets of laws. The new forest service board
would face a novel enough task without having to address BLM
decisions as well. Since this board will venture into uncharted
territory, it seems reasonable to work the kinks out of the system
with a board of forest appeals before creating a larger superboard.
4. Standing to Bring an Appeal
Like the project-level appeals process mandated by the 1992
Appropriations Act,312 standing to bring a Forest Service appeal
before the board would be limited to individuals who submitted
comments during the pre-decisional phase. Claims asserted in the
appeal would likewise be limited to those raised during the comment
period.
This standing limitation would better serve the purposes of the
appeals system. Appellants would be forced to raise their objections
early in the decisionmaking process when the agency could more
readily change its decision based on such objections. Ensuing appeals
would likely be more carefully targeted. A standing rule would also
prevent appellants from staging dilatory and potentially abusive last-
minute arguments. The rule would work only if coupled with the
pre-decisional public participation provisions discussed above. A
more limited rule of standing is a fair price for appellants to pay
in exchange for appeal procedures better suited to reaching and
resolving the merits of their claims.
A critical, and possibly large, exception to this strict standing
rule would be available where the agency's decision is based on
information or analysis which the appellant could not have fairly
ascertained from the predecisional notice of the action. In such
instances, appellants who would otherwise lack standing could raise
325. Pub. L. No. 102-381, § 322(c), 106 Stat. 1374 (1992).
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objections to the decision based on the new evidence or analysis
asserted by the agency. This would ensure that the actual grounds
for decision are tested, and would prevent the agency from fore-
closing scrutiny of its decisions by basing them on facts or rationales
not asserted in the predecisional phase of the action. The 1993
Appropriations Act rule is deficient in failing to provide for this
exception.326
5. Dismissal of Claims
The new appeal system would explicitly authorize the board to
dismiss frivolous claims. Although the current rule already provides
such authority,3 27 there is widespread confusion about the issue.
Even the Chief of the Forest Service has implied that the agency
lacks authority to dismiss frivolous claims, complaining that the
current system is overwhelmed with bad-faith appeals. Under the
new system, such appeals could be dismissed without delay.
6. Consolidation
A potential problem with an appeals system open to all mem-
bers of the public is the possibility of numerous appeals of the same
decision. If all appellants are permitted to assert separate appeals,
then the appeals board might be forced to wade through a quagmire
of conflicting and repetitious claims, particularly in controversial
cases. To avoid this problem, the new appeals system could allow
the board to consolidate in a single appeal similar claims arising
from the same set of circumstances and designate one or several
lead appellants. The board should monitor the consolidation to
ensure fair leadership. While consolidation cuts off the ability of
some appellants to assert claims on their own behalf a28 it is justified
in order to present the appeals board with a manageable set of
appellants and claims. Because all appeals would be consolidated in
this manner, there would be no need for a right of intervention as
under the current appeals rule unless an intervenor could show that
consolidated leadership would fail to represent its interests .329
326. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
327. 36 C.F.R. § 217.11 (1988).
328. To preserve the issue of consolidation for judicial review, consolidation orders
would themselves be appealable through a motion for reconsideration before the panel that
issued the consolidation order. If a court later reverses the consolidation order, it would
remand the case to the board with instructions to allow the appellant to bring a separate
claim.
329. The interests of individuals who support a decision being appealed would normally
be protected by the agency/appellee. At the discretion of the board, however, interested
non-appellants could be permitted to submit amicus briefs on either side.
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7. Proceedings
Appellants would file a statement of reasons in a separate
document from the notice of appeal, as under the 1983 version of
the appeals rule. a30 A thirty to forty-five day period following notice
would allow appellants sufficient time to gather information and
sharpen their arguments.. The agency would then file a responsive
statement, to which the appellant could respond in a brief reply.
Forcing the challenged decisionmaker to respond focuses the appeal
on precise issues of disagreement. It also focuses the attention of
the decisionmaker, who may devise a settlement.
Appellants would have the right to present an oral argument
before the panel, but they could waive this right if desired. The
oral argument would allow the appellant to contest the agency's
decision, the agency to respond, and the board to question infor-
mally. Oral argument would help the review board focus on the
important issues before it. It would also enable the board panel to
probe the arguments of both sides.
Where an appeal raises substantial issues of disputed scientific
fact, the panel could conduct a more formal, trial-type proceeding.
Such a proceeding could include oral testimony, cross-examination,
recorded transcripts, and other procedural devices normally associ-
ated with administrative adjudications on the record. The proceeding
could be conducted before the panel assigned to the appeal, under
the lead of the legal expert assigned to the panel. Or, the panel
might delegate the fact-finding task to an administrative law judge,
as the IBLA does. While these quasi-adjudicative proceedings would
add to the formality and duration of appeals, they are justified by
the need to obtain an adequate evidentiary basis for decisions in
difficult cases.
The forest appeals board should stay decisions unless the public
interest requires otherwise. 3 ' Resource development projects usually
become irreversible once ground disturbing activity occurs. The
automatic stay prevents the appeals process from systematically
disadvantaging conservationist appellants.
The Forest Service should also provide a "fast track" mecha-
nism for expedited resolution of certain appeals. This approach
should be considered for appeals where the issues are well-defined
330. See 36 C.F.R. § 211.18(c)(1) (1992). Similar time frames for filing this document,
the responsive statement, and the reply would also apply.
331. See infra notes 349-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the standards
IBLA appellants must meet to secure a stay.
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or minor, the parties consent to expedited review, the costs of a
stay are unusually high, the challenge has bearing on other pending
appeals, or there is some circumstance that makes a rapid decision
particularly important.
8. Decision
The board would issue a written opinion providing a reasoned
explanation for its decision and make explicit rulings on all non-
frivolous claims. Particularly important would be the board's find-
ings on charges that a Forest Service decision violates the sustain-
ability principle. Appellate findings relating to the application of
the sustainability principle are the key to integrating procedure with
the objectives of public forest management. These findings would
nurture the development of the sustainability principle as its contours
become more distinct through repeated application to different si-
tuations. An explicit requirement to make findings forces the board
to make the difficult calls on sustainability. Supported by an opinion
that clearly lays out the scientific and social considerations, the
board's decision would advance the national and international de-
bate.
To expedite appeals, regulations should establish reasonable but
strict deadlines for the forest appeals board. In contrast, IBLA
administrative judges have no time limits for issuing opinions and
appellants sometimes wait more than a year for a decision.
Written opinions should be compiled and indexed for future
use by line officers and the public. Appeal decisions would have
precedential value, tempered by the geographical limitations of re-
source management solutions.
9. Discretionary Review by Secretary of Agriculture
In all cases, the Secretary of Agriculture would have the dis-
cretion to review the board's decision. The Secretary would be
required to decide whether to take the case within a short time
period, such as twenty days, after the board's decision. The Secretary
would be required to issue a decision on the merits of the appeal
within a specific time period after that, such as forty-five days for
project-level appeals and sixty days for plan-level appeals. The
Secretary would not be permitted to take a case before the appeals
board has issued its decision, and the Secretary's decision could be
based only on the record that was before the board. This contrasts
with appeals of BLM decisions, which may be decided by the
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Secretary of the Interior before the IBLA rules. The Secretary of
Agriculture should not be allowed to avoid potentially embarrassing
findings by an independent board by prematurely deciding an ap-
peal. If the Secretary fails to act on an appeal within the time
period for initiating discretionary review, the board's decision would
be deemed the final administrative action of the Department.
10. Judicial Review
Judicial review in all cases would be in the U.S. Court of
Appeals circuit in which the disputed plan or project is located.
The district courts would not be involved. This is a significant
departure from the current system, in which judicial review always
begins in the district courts even though they render decisions as if
they were appellate courts 3 2 Therefore, to implement our proposal,
Congress would need to provide for direct review in the courts of
appeals, as it has done in several environmental statutes."' Along
with repeal of the 1993 Interior Appropriations rider section 322,'14
this is the only action required by Congress to implement our
proposal.
If the board's decision is issued without trial-type proceedings
on the record, the reviewing court would apply the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard of review.333 However, if the board uses trial-
type proceedings to establish a basis for resolving evidentiary dis-
putes, under the APA the court would use the more searching
"substantial evidence" test.336 The availability of this higher standard
of review for certain administrative appeal decisions would obviate
any need for trials de novo in the district courts. This change would
reduce litigation costs for both appellants and the agency, while
preserving an active role for the courts in appropriate cases.
This limitation on judicial review is a fair trade-off for appel-
lants if the loss of the district court forum is worth the gain of a
fair, independent, credible forest appeal board. The appeals board
332. Cronin v. United States Dept. of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 443 (7th Cir. 1990).
District courts review challenges to IBLA decisions.
333. See e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1988); Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(a) (1988). In the
absence of a statutory provision providing for judicial review at the court of appeals level,
citizens harmed by administrative action may rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to seek review in
federal district court.
334. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
No. 102-381, § 322, 106 Stat. 1374 (1992).
335. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
336. Id. § 706(2)(E).
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offers an appellant the advantages of administrative determinations
based both on compliance with statutes and regulations and a
substantive standard currently unavailable in any forum. The Forest
Service would benefit from a reduction in and simplification of
litigation.
IV. EVALUATION
The proposed reforms discussed in the preceding part of this
article depart significantly from the Forest Service's current prac-
tices. To evaluate the proposal's merits, we first discuss reasonabale
objectives against which appeals systems should be judged. Part A
describes three categories of objectives and Part B applies them to
the proposed independent appeals board. Although the proposal is
not without costs and disadvantages, on balance it provides a better
appeals system on all counts.
A. Objectives for Evaluating Appeals
We evaluate our proposed reforms based on three fundamental
objectives of administrative appeals: wisdom, efficiency, and legit-
imacy.3 7 The first category, wisdom, focuses on the outcomes. On-
the-ground, resource management decisions ought to be improved
as a result of an appeals system. We use the term "wisdom" to
describe this axis because it resonates with the traditional aspirations
of resource management professions. The second category, effi-
ciency, focuses on the appeals process. The third category, legiti-
macy, addresses the role that appeals play in the overall fairness
and accessibility of agency decisionmaking.
We make no attempt to rank the relative importance of these
criteria. Nor do we believe that strengths or weaknesses of appeals
systems in these categories can be quantified. Nevertheless, wisdom,
efficiency, and legitimacy provide a workable structure for discussion
337. These categories of objectives are similar to the goals of administrative procedure
articulated by others. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, Administrative Procedure Reform: The
Effects of S. 1663 on the Conduct of Federal Rate Proceedings, 16 ADMIN. L. REv. 108,
112 (1964) (setting out the goals of accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability). Cramton's goal
of "accuracy" implies some objective benchmark of truth against which an administrative
decision will be measured. Surely, Cramton had in mind a more conventional adjudicative
model than resource management appeals. Our goal of "wisdom" focuses not only on the
decision of the appellate body but also on the decisions, whether appealed or not, that the
agency makes with regard to its statutory mandates. We discuss "legitimacy" rather than
acceptability because it better suggests the genuine qualities of an appeals system rather its
appearance.
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and comparison. They also encompass the broad spectrum of tech-
nocratic, democratic, and due process values that animate the reform
debate.
1. Wisdom
A basic objective of appeals is to rectify errors. For example,
inadequate compliance with requirements for environmental impact
analysis, errors in interpretation or application of regulations, and
technical mistakes should be filtered out of the decisionmaking flow
by an appeals system. More generally, an administrative appeals
system can be used to examine the rigor with which the agency
applies the principles that constitute its own legislative mandates.
Coordination is an increasingly important element of wise re-
source management. Coordination ensures that different manage-
ment units are not working at cross-purposes. Agencies should
account for spill-over effects that impose costs on neighboring land
managers. A reviewer whose purview is broader than the decision-
maker's can account for such effects and promote more constructive
integration of activities and plans. The Forest Service's recent em-
phasis on landscape management to promote biological diversity,
for example, requires a high degree of coordination which an appeals
process can reinforce.
Finally, administrative review can help separate social policy
judgments from decisions based purely on science. Currently, ap-
pellants perceive in the Forest Service a bias toward commodity
production cloaked in the mantle of science. Obfuscation of genu-
inely determinative factors ultimately raises problems of legitimacy
but is rooted in an appeals process that fails to elucidate decisions
for objective evaluation. Incomprehensible computer programs,
sweeping silvicultural prescriptions, and unrealistic natural science
predictive models heighten the public's skepticism about the objec-
tivity, and hence wisdom, of Forest Service decisions. The Forest
Service is responsible for choosing between incompatible uses. A
wise balance requires an honest, open planning process that more
accurately reflects the real considerations involved in decisions.
2. Efficiency
An efficient appeals system minimizes the cost and delay of
reviewing agency decisions. An important goal for any administrative
appeals process is to narrow issues for judicial review. Judicial
economy is important to appellants, who face greater costs and
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further delays in complex litigation. An administrative system should
hone controversies. The peripheral, nonessential issues to a central
dispute can be stripped away by an administrative appeal, leaving
a sharply defined issue for a court to resolve.
Predictability is an essential element of efficiency because it
eliminates the incentive to appeal issues repeatedly. An appeals
system can foster predictability by producing an evolving body of
decisions accessible to both the agency and the public. Procedural
predictability is important as well. Appeals should be resolved
promptly according to established deadlines so that people interested
in the outcomes can reliably plan for contingencies.
3. Legitimacy
An appeals system should recognize the importance of public
land planning to affected individuals by providing a right to mean-
ingful review. The right to file an appeal conveys more than simply
the dignity of due process. It gives assurance that participation early
in the decisionmaking process is worth the effort, because planners
cannot simply choose to ignore relevant viewpoints. Similarly, an
appeals process encourages forest managers to engage more deeply
in planning. Public officials must do more than merely create the
appearance of deliberation if appeals force them to show how they
weighed the merits of public views.
Appeal decisions are unlikely to gain legitimacy unless chal-
lenges are heard by fair, disinterested reviewers. An appeals system
that is widely perceived to be biased against appellants lacks cred-
ibility, and using it becomes a hollow exercise in exhausting admin-
istrative remedies to reach judicial review. An open, objective appeals
process can also legitimate controversial agency decisions by sub-
jecting them to more rigorous testing. Such a process strengthens a
unit manager's difficult decision by confirming it at a higher level.
An appellate reviewer can ensure that the validity of a decision
is not obscured by opaque language. Besides advancing the public's
understanding of the agency's actions, this function bolsters a de-
cision's stability. A clearly reasoned decision, supported by an
adequate record, can better weather frequent turnover in resource
management staff.
B. Application to Independent Appeals Board
1. Wisdom
a. Strengths
Unlike the current appeals procedure, the proposed system gives
responsibility for reviewing decisions to a body that is independent
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from the agency's line officer hierarchy. This arrangement will tend
to produce better appeal results for several reasons. Because of its
independence within the agency, the appeals board would be less
influenced by considerations that are unrelated to the merits of
decisions under review, such as concerns about politics, job security,
and the need to perform many roles in addition to deciding appeals.
Line officers are influenced by the many pressures of their positions.",
Even if unfounded, accusations of bias unavoidably affect reviewing
officers, either making them overcompensate for bias by erring on
the side of appellants, or casting them in advance in the role of
antagonists to appellants' claims. Repeated allegations of prejudice
and partiality inevitably corrode the objectivity of reviewing officers.
Creation of an independent appeals board would also improve
the clarity, uniformity, and substance of appeal decisions. The board's
only job would be to decide appeals. In contrast to agency line
officers, who must balance their appellate roles with a host of
competing demands, members of the appeals board can concentrate
on performing only one function well. Experience with a nationwide
supply of appeals will expose the board to a variety of issues and
situations, giving the board a depth of knowledge and precedent that
will enrich its decisions. The multidisciplinary composition of the
board, reflecting equal measures of legal, scientific, and technical
expertise, will also enhance its understanding of the complex problems
raised in appeals. The appeals board will neither preclude nor relieve
line officers from exercising their responsibility to issue policy and
develop standards and guidelines for forest management. Indeed, the
board will partly rely on these materials in reviewing decisions.
Relieving line officers of the task of deciding appeals would
enable them to focus more of their energy on the complex problems
in the field. The existing appeals program asks too much of line
officers. Under the current system, they must both competently
perform the normal aspects of their job, and also render formal
judgments of subordinates' decisions. This system places line officers
in an awkward position. Effective supervision often requires a quiet
management style-pointing out errors and praising accomplishments
without fanfare or widespread notice. Good supervision also requires
trust and confidentiality among members of the agency. All of this
is undermined by requiring supervising officers not only to point out
mistakes of their subordinates but to do so in public appeals decisions.
338. The 1987 Appeals Review Team found that "most believe the current process is
biased, because it is an internal review, and that there is a double standard where timelines
are concerned." 53 Fed. Reg. 17,313 (1988).
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Consolidating appeals in a single board would also promote
better coordination among forest units. A particular action may have
consequences that extend beyond the jurisdictional confines of a forest
unit. Forest supervisors might not give sufficient attention to spill-
over problems and environmental impacts that affect lands outside
of the forest unit. The appeals board would not have such a juris-
dictionally constrained view. The board would be in a better position
than line officers to take into account the extra-jurisdictional effects
of actions under review. It also would be in a better position to
ensure that similar issues are resolved in similar ways throughout the
far-reaching national forest system. Assigning appeals to scores of
line officers across the country fragments agency management. Uni-
formity need not ignore special circumstances or local conditions;
however, it will require an adequate explanation for local variance
with sustainability principles. A single appeals board can better assure
that appeals decisions are consistent.
Finally, an appeals board would have the time, expertise, and
experience to develop a sound and practical approach to applying
the sustainability principle. The concept of sustainability can gain
content and have a practical effect only through repeated application
and the experience that accompanies it. The development of this
concept will require the full attention of a multidisciplinary expert
body. Allowing the sustainability principle to evolve through a series
of decisions by an independent board would give the Forest Service
a valuable opportunity to develop a workable understanding of the
concept. If it succeeds in this effort, the agency would create a model
of applied decisionmaking of international proportions: applicable
not only to the United States, but to many other nations that are
struggling to advance sustainability.
b. Weaknesses
The Forest Service has been accused of seeking to "bomb proof"
its decisions to guard against administrative appeals and litigation.339
Decisionmakers who must keep one eye on future legal challenges
may lack the courage to experiment with new ways of resolving
problems. Thus an appeals process, particularly one perceived as
being "formal" or "legalistic," might lead to cautious decisions rather
339. As a Forest Service officer put it, the appeals process "[f]orces us to emphasize
avoiding appeals rather than be better managers." Internal Input, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, APPEALS REVIEW BRIEFING PAPER, Appendix A-I1 (Sept.
1987).
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than to good ones. But this problem ostensibly exists in any system
of administrative appeals. It is not clear how the fear of being second-
guessed by the appeals board would deter creativity more than the
fear of being second-guessed under the current system. The appeals
board, moreover, would be more likely to create independent, in-
novative solutions of its own that might facilitate future compromise.
Consolidating appellate responsibility in a single body cuts against
the agency's tradition of decentralization. The Forest Service has long
prided itself on a bottom-up approach to decisionmaking, echoing
Gifford Pinchot's dictum that local decisions should be made on
local grounds. ° While local questions do often need to be made on
local grounds, the Forest Service now deals with matters (such as
maintenance of biological diversity) that are increasingly national in
scope. Purely local questions may now be more the exception than
the rule, and decisionmakers cannot simply respond to local condi-
tions without considering the broader effects of their actions. The
simple fact is that federal law prescribes the bounds of management
that constrain local autonomy. Testing decisions against nationwide
legal principles is a predominant justification for administrative ap-
peals. The resulting appeals decisions should reflect a consistent
approach to similar issues. Thus, while the proposed appeals board
would depart from the agency's tradition of decentralization, it would
do so for important and worthwhile reasons.
2. Efficiency
a. Strengths
In contrast to the existing appeals system, the proposal would
limit standing in administrative appeals to individuals who participated
in the pre-decisional phases of the action. This standing restriction
would place a premium on pre-decisional comments and negotiation.
Parties would be required to air all of their objections before a
decision is made, creating a better opportunity to resolve disputes
early in the process. A strict standing rule would also prevent ap-
pellants from withholding their best arguments until appeal, which
causes unnecessary delays in the decisionmaking process. In order for
the Forest Service to realize this benefit, it will have to improve both
on its method of giving pre-decisional notice of actions and its
disclosure of relevant information.
340. "In the management of each reserve, local questions will be decided on local
grounds .... U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST SERVICE, USE BOOK 17 (1906
ed.).
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The proposal authorizes the dismissal of frivolous claims. Critics
often depict the current system as one bedeviled by sham appeals. If
an appeal truly lacks merit, the appeals board should be able to
dismiss it readily. It appears that the Forest Service cannot currently
implement the current system efficiently and dispose of frivolous
appeals; the proposed system cures this defect. The proposed con-
solidation requirement also advances the cause of efficiency. To
diminish the burden on the appeals board, appellants bringing similar
claims would be required to consolidate their claims under one or
more lead appellants.
Although the proposal adds some new procedural elements to
the administrative appeals system, it also eliminates one layer of
judicial review. This might cause a longer wait for a final agency
action, but it will accelerate ultimate resolution of major conflicts
that go to court, thereby reducing litigation delays. Also, compared
to the current system, an appeals board would decide issues more
predictably and would be less often reversed upon judicial review.
b. Weaknesses
Still, a board of forest appeals may need more time to render
a decision than the first-level reviewer under the current rules. Fact-
finding hearings before the board would add another layer of legal
formality to the administrative appeals process, and could lead to
further delays. However, delays associated with the new process could
be minimized by imposing reasonable time limitations on the board's
consideration of appeals.
3. Legitimacy
a. Strengths
Under the current appeals system, there are as many fora for
appeals in the Forest Service as there are line officers above the
district ranger level. Such a multitude of appeal officers, unguided
by clear standards for rendering appeal decisions, produces inconsis-
tencies in the quality and accessibility of appeal decisions. Appeal
decisions are not cataloged or indexed, making research nearly im-
possible and hindering efforts to develop an applied "common law"
of Forest Service appeals. The disorganized state of Forest Service
appeals also makes appellants suspicious of the objectivity of appeals
rulings, making the decisions appear more dependent on the whims
of the reviewing officer than on any objective body of policies and
legal principles.
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The proposed reforms would make the appeals process more
understandable and available to the public and the rest of the agency.
Decisions would be issued by a single body rather than by scores of
separate individuals. All decisions would be accessible to interested
persons, and the board would develop a body of precedent to guide
future decisions. The independence of the board would add to its
impartiality and institutional prestige. By providing appellants with
an objective opportunity to contest agency decisions, the board would
earn respect, and its decisions will garner acceptance.
b. Weaknesses
Because the proposed reforms break sharply with prior practice,
they may initially meet with resistance. Administrative appeals within
the Forest Service have been a hotly contested subject for years.
Practically any solution will alienate some parties. A solution like the
one proposed here, that expands procedures available in some in-
stances but restricts them in others, is bound to provide something
for almost everyone to oppose. Thus, this proposal is likely to be
controversial; some participants in the debate over forest policy will
probably resist it even if it is adopted. The proposal is not a panacea.
Although it cannot solve by itself the many problems plaguing the
Forest Service, it does offer a better mechanism for dealing with
these problems.
V. CONCLUSION
The administrative appeals system used by the Forest Service
can become a means of resolving the controversies that surround the
resources of the nation's public forests. But significant changes, both
substantive and procedural, need to be made if appeals are to achieve
this goal. Substantively, appeals must determine whether agency de-
cisions are consistent with the legislative mandates pertaining to the
management of national forests. Most importantly, appeals must
ascertain whether the agency's actions are consistent with sustainable
use of the nation's renewable resources. Although it is rarely easy to
decide whether a particular forest plan or implementing decision
satisfies the substainability principle, the statutes require the agency
to address this critical question. Moreover, the Forest Service can
evaluate sustainability with greater scientific clarity and consistency
than other criteria, such as "multiple use," making it a good can-
didate for resolution in an appellate proceeding. Setting substantive
standards for administrative review will restore public confidence in
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the agency and renew the Forest Service's position as an international
leader in resource management.
Procedurally, the current appeals system must be transformed in
structure and purpose. Instead of being a means for reviewing deci-
sions informally within the line officer hierarchy, the administrative
appeals system should provide a more formal mechanism for testing
agency decisions against the requirements of federal law. To accom-
plish this goal and provide a fair and open process for all parties,
the administrative appeal should be decided by an independent, multi-
disciplinary board of review. An appellate review board making case-
specific determinations of compliance with Forest Service mandates,
including sustainability, can best apply difficult principles and build
precedent to improve future decisions. Together, these changes would
represent a significant innovation in Forest Service administration.
Appeals cannot cure all of our land management problems, but they
can reshape some of the institutional incentives that have led to
stalemate and disaffection and aid us in our elusive quest for sus-
tainable environmental management.
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APPENDIX:
ADMINISTRATWVE APPEALS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Because the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI or Interior)
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) makes resource management
decisions similar to the Forest Service, a comparison of appeals
systems is instructive. There are two tracks for BLM appeals. Re-
source management planning and land classification are handled by
the BLM through a protest procedure.34' This procedure is discussed
in Part B, below. Other decisions made by the BLM and other
Interior agencies are appealed to the Interior Board of Land Appeals
(IBLA). The IBLA's caseload primarily involves oil and gas leasing,
surface mining and hard-rock mining claim issues. 42 Other cases
involve rights-of-way, grazing, coal lease readjustments, timber sales,
and general property rights. 343 The discussion of the IBLA in this
Appendix focuses on appeals of BLM decisions because they are
likely to be the most analogous to Forest Service decisions.
Table 2 summarizes both DOI appeals systems in terms of the
same procedural elements used to characterize the past and proposed
Forest Service appeals systems in Table 1.
A. The IBLA
The IBLA procedural structure parallels to some extent the
proposed independent appeals board for the Forest Service. The IBLA
was established in 1970, in response to recommendations of the Public
Land Law Review Commission's report, One Third of the Nation's
Land.' Before this time, the BLM reviewed appeals internally, through
a system similar to the present Forest Service appeals process. Con-
gress subsequently endorsed the Commission's recommendation in
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act by requiring the
Secretary of Interior to structure adjudication procedures to assure
"objective administrative review of individual decisions . .1.4.
1. Who May Appeal
According to the Department of Interior regulations, subpart E,
"[a]ny party to a case who is adversely affected by a decision of an
341. 43 C.F.R. § 4.410(a)(1) (1991).
342. Wn. Philip Horton, IBLA Practice and Procedure, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Spring 1986, at 36.
343. Id.
344. ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LANDS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE
CONGRESS BY THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION (1970).
345. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(5) (1988).
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officer of the Bureau of Land Management or of an administrative
law judge shall have a right to appeal" to the IBLA.346 The Secretary
may approve an appealed BLM decision at any time,4 7 and thus
deprive the IBLA of jurisdiction to hear the case. Resource manage-
ment plans are not appealable to the IBLA.34
2. Effect of Appeal on Implementation of BLM
Decision
Until recently, an IBLA appellant secured a stay of the appealed
BLM decision automatically, unless the public interest required oth-
erwise. 349 This stood in sharp contrast to the Forest Service's Part
217 process where the appellant has the burden to specify the adverse
effects of the decision and show how the harmful effects on resources
in the area would prevent a meaningful appeal on the merits. 350 On
the last full day of the Bush Administration, however, the Secretary
of the Interior reversed the IBLA rule to provide for implementation
of an appealed decision unless the appellant demonstrates that a stay
is necessary in accordance with standards generally used by courts in
ruling on motions for a temporary restraining order.351
3. Filing the Notice of Appeal and Statement of Reasons
To commence an appeal, the appellant must file a "notice of
appeal" with the BLM office that made the disputed decision (not
with the board) within thirty days352 after receiving the notice of
decision.353 The appellant must also file a "statement of reasons"
why the decision should be overturned, either as part of the notice
of appeal or, within thirty days after filing the notice of appeal, as
a separate document submitted to the IBLA.3 14 After filing an initial
346. 43 C.F.R. § 4.410(a) (1991).
347. Id. § 4.410(a)(3).
348. Id. § 4.410(a)(1).
349. Id. § 4.21(a). Onshore oil and gas development permits were an exception to this
rule and remained in effect while an IBLA appeal was pending. Id. §§ 3150.2 & 3165.4.
350. 36 C.F.R. § 217.10(d)(3)(ii) (1992).
351. 58 Fed. Reg. 4939 (1993) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 4.21) (defining the
standards as: (1) relative harm of a stay to the parties; (2) likelihood of appellant's success
on the merits; (3) likelihood of immediate and irreparable harm if a stay is not granted;
and (4) the public interest in a stay).
352. 43 C.F.R. § 4.411 (1991). All time limits are automatically extended by a 10-day
grace period to allow for slow mail service. So the 30-day limit is really a 40-day limit.
Id. § 4.401(a).
353. Id. § 4.411.
354. Id. § 4.412(a).
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statement of reasons, the appellant may file "additional statements
of reasons and written arguments or briefs" within thirty days after
filing the notice of appeal. 55 The appellant must serve the notice of
appeal and any statement of reasons on all adverse parties.356
4. The Answer
Parties served with the notice of appeal may respond to the
appellant's arguments in an "answer." Answers must be filed within
thirty days after service of the statement of reasons. The answer must
"state the reasons why the answerer thinks the appeal should not be
sustained. '111 7 The BLM's failure to file an answer does not result in
default, although, according to Judge Horton, the IBLA "frequently
observes that no answer was filed in the course of holding for the
appellant.""35 The BLM does not file answers in the majority of
appeals, but in some cases the board has ordered the agency to file
an answer.359 The regulations do not provide an opportunity for
responding to the answer.
5. Intervention
The IBLA may allow intervention at its discretion. Interested
persons may file a request to appear as amicus curiae. If granted,
the amicus appearance "will be for such purposes as established-by
the [IBLA]." 36°
6. Proceedings
Oral arguments are discretionary with the board.36 To resolve
factual issues, a party may request that the case or portions of it be
referred to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in the Office of
Hearings and Appeals. 36 The board, on its own motion, may also
make such a referral. If a hearing is ordered, the board specifies the
issues on which the hearing is to be held.363 The ALJs conduct
hearings in accordance with standard APA procedures, including
subpoena of witnesses, testimony under oath, and the right of cross-
355. Id.
356. Id. § 4.413(a).
357. Id. § 4.414.
358. Horton, supra note 342, at 39.
359. Id.
360. 43 C.F.R. § 4.3(c) (1991).
361. Id. § 4.25.
362. Id. § 4.415.
363. Id.
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examination.'" Appeals of ALJs' interlocutory rulings are not avail-
able without permission of the board. a65
7. Decision
Appeals are assigned at random among the eleven judges of the
IBLA.36 The board occasionally decides difficult issues en banc, but
most decisions are rendered by a panel of two or three judges assigned
to the case. Unless the Secretary of the Interior intervenes to decide
the appeal, the board's ruling is the final agency action for the
purposes of the APA. 7
In deciding appeals, the board's authority is commensurate with
that of the Secretary.3 6 The regulations do not indicate the specific
grounds for affirming or reversing the agency, but reversals most
commonly result from an incorrect application of the law, and less
commonly from a finding that the agency's action was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.3 6 The appellant must establish
error by a preponderance of the evidence.3 70 If the board reverses a
decision, its normal practice is to remand the case to BLM for further
consideration.37' BLM decisions are affirmed in about two thirds of
the appeals. 72
Decisions of the IBLA are collected and published by a subscriber
service. Legal research is facilitated by quarterly "Index-Digests" of
IBLA decisions, which are consolidated in a hardbound digest every
five years. This arrangement contrasts with the disorganized state of
the Forest Service's appeal decisions, which are not regularly published
or indexed.
B. BLM Protest Procedure for Resource Management Plans
As noted previously,3 73 the IBLA does not have jurisdiction to
hear appeals of FLPMA resource management plans (RMPs). The
364. See id. §§ 4.430-.439.
365. Id. § 4.28.
366. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, APPEALS OF FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT
PLANS AND ACTrms 7 (Feb. 20, 1990) [hereinafter CRS REPORT II].
367. 43 C.F.R. § 4.403 (1991). The Secretary may decide an appeal either before or
after the IBLA rules. Id. § 4.5(a).
368. Id. § 4.1.
369. Horton, supra note 342, at 38.
370. Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1984) (reversing prior requirement of
clear and definite showing of error, as discussed in Horton, supra note 342, at 38).
371. Horton, supra note 342, at 38.
372. CRS REPORT II, supra note 366, at 10.
373. See supra notes 341-43 and accompanying text.
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RMPs are analogous to Forest Service LRMPs. Protests may occur
before either initial RMP adoption or amendment. Persons wishing
to challenge the approval or amendment of an RMP must use the
"protest" procedure. 74 The IBLA does decide appeals of project
level decisions that implement the RMP.
The protest procedure provides a narrower form of review than
either the IBLA process or the Forest Service's Part 217 appeal
procedures. The procedure is limited to persons who participated in
the earlier planning process and who have an interest which may be
adversely affected by the approval or amendment of the RMP. 7 1
The protest may raise only those issues which were submitted during
the planning process.376
Protests must be in writing and filed with the Director within
thirty days of EPA's publication of the notice of receipt of the final
EIS.37 The protest must indicate the parts of the RMP being pro-
tested, the issues being protested, and provide a concise statement
explaining why the State Director's proposed decision is believed to
be wrong.378 A unique feature of the protest procedure is that it
occurs before the agency makes a final decision. A protest, filed after
the final EIS on an RMP, delays the approval of the preferred
alternative until the Director renders a decision on the protest. 79
The Director "shall promptly render a decision on the protest.'"180
The decision on the protest must be in writing and must specify the
reasons for the decision.381 The Director takes about nine or ten
months to rule on a protest.382 Of the sixty-one FLPMA resource
management plans completed at the beginning of 1990, about fifty
had been protested, with each RMP generating about a dozen separate
protests.
The Director may dismiss a protest without ruling on its merits,
deny the protest in whole or in part, return the proposed decision to
the State Director for clarification or further consideration, or uphold
protest in whole or in part.383 The director will uphold a protest
374. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-2 (1992).
375. Id. § 1610.5-2(a).
376. Id.
377. Id. § 1610.5-2(a)(1).
378. Id. § 1610.5-2(a)(2).
379. Id. § 1610.5-1(b).
380. Id. § 1610.5-2(a)(3).
381. Id.
382. CRS REPORT, supra note 133, at 9.
383. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, INTERIM
GUIANCE: RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN APPROVAL AND USE § 1617.21(F) (Attachment 1-
4).
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when: approval of the proposed RMP would violate Federal statutes
or regulations; approval of the proposed RMP would be contrary to
the Director's policy guidance; or significant aspects of the proposed
RMP are based upon invalid or incomplete information.
38 4
384. Id.
454 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64
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TABLE 2: DOI ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
Important Elements of IBLA BLM
Administrative Appeals Process I RMP Protests
Decisions Subject to Appeal Decisions not approved RMPs; May raise only those
by Secretary; RMP issues submitted during
decisions excluded from planning
IBLA review
Standing Persons adversely affected Persons who participated in
by decision of BLM planning & who have an
officer or AU interest that may be adversely
affected by RMP.
Levels of Appeal: Reviewer(s) Some decisions must first One appeal to the Director
be appealed to an AU;
Independent
administrative judge
review
Notice of Appeal: Deadline 30 days 30 days after EPA's
publication of receipt of FEIS
Notice of Appeal: Content Identification of decision; 'Why State Director's proposed
May contain argument decision is believed to be
wrong
Intervention (in first level of Discretionary; Interested None
appeal) persons may request to
appear as amicus curiae
Stays Granted if appellant N/A
meets judicial standards
for issuing a temporary
restraining order
Appellant's Argument Statement of reasons may In notice of appeal
be filed or amended
within 30 days after
notice of appeal
Deciding Officer's Responsive Discretionary response to N/A because no decision yet
Statement the appeal within 30 days made; State Director submits
report analyzing the protest
Appellant's Reply Discretionary with IBLA N/A
Oral Argument Discretionary (seldom None
granted)
Decision No deadline Promptly (usually 9-10
months)
